Egypt’s ban on Hamas: a political decision?

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/03/09/Egypt-s-ban-on-Hamas-a-political-decision-.html

On March 4, the Cairo Urgent Matters Court banned the activities of Hamas, ordered the closure of its offices in Egyptand prohibited any kind of interaction with it. The ruling came in response to a lawsuit filed by Egyptian lawyer Samir Sabry, if only partially. Sabry originally demanded that Hamas be designated a terrorist organization citing its affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood, now a terrorist organization in Egypt, and its designation as a terrorist organization by several countries across the world as well as the involvement of its members in storming Egyptian prisoners during the 2011 uprising and the group’s violation of the Gaza border. “I presented to the court 25 CDs that prove Hamas’s involvement in several terrorist operations in Egypt whether in the Sinai Peninsula or Cairo,” Sabry said in a TV interview. These operations, he explained, included the bombing of State Security headquarters in Cairo and Mansoura and the killing of Egyptian soldiers in Sinai. “I even submitted CDs that prove Hamas’ involvement in other atrocities inside the Gaza Strip, like torture.”

Based on the ruling, the ban applies to Hamas and all entities affiliated to it and funded or supported, financially or otherwise, by it. The ban in its current form is temporary pending the ruling on another case before the Cairo Criminal Court, in which Hamas faces charges of espionage and prison break. Unlike what is commonly believed, or what some media outlets had actually reported, Hamas has not been officially declared a terrorist organization as is the case with the Muslim Brotherhood and as was initially requested in Sabry’s lawsuit. Sabry, however, sees the current ruling, which he considers “historic,” as conveying the same meaning. “Banning Hamas’ activities is proof enough that it engaged in terrorist activities,” he said in a TV interview. The verdict, he added, is enough to ensure that Hamas will no longer pose a threat to Egypt. “Through this verdict, Hamas members will be denied entry into Egypt and the ones already in the country will be arrested,” he said. According to Sabry, this ruling is final and no one except the president, the prime minister and the interior minister can appeal it.

“This is a purely political verdict,” said senior Hamas member Mahmoud al-Zahhar. According to Zahhar, the verdict is void because the case is incomplete. “It was a one-sided case. Hamas was not given the chance to defend itself and refute the evidence presented against it,” he explained. Zahhar communicated an perceivable threat to Sabry. “One day, we will take him to task.” For Hamas member Yehia Moussa, the ruling tarnishes the image of Egypt rather than Hamas. “This is a grave affront to Egypt’s role in the Arab world and its history of supporting the Palestinian cause,” he said in an interview. “Plus, this is a punishment for the Palestinian people not Hamas.” Ezzat al-Rashq, a member of Hamas’s politburo agreed with the last point underlined by Moussa.

“This verdict means tightening the blockade against Palestinians in Gaza and increases the possibility of another Israeli aggression,” he said in a statement.

Both Zahhar and Moussa insisted that Hamas has no offices or activities in Egypt. “This is sheer propaganda,” said Moussa.

Muslim Brotherhood supporters outside Egypt condemned the ban with Rashed al-Ghanouchi, head of the Tunisian Islamist party al-Nahda considering it “an oppressive verdict by an oppressive regime” and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan arguing that it is “an attempt to curry favor with the Zionists.”

French historian and expert on Arab affairs Jean-François Legrain saw the ruling as another battle in the war waged by the Egyptian state on the Muslim Brotherhood. “Hamas is paying the price for the regional conditions in the aftermath of the marginalization of the Muslim Brotherhood,” he told Le Monde. Legrain did not view this step to be in Israel’s interest as is commonly believed. “Israel does not want to get rid of Hamas because it is the only group that can control the Gaza Strip,” he explained. “True, it imposes a blockade on Gaza and makes life hard for Gazans, but does not incite them into getting rid of Hamas.” Mordechai Kedar, an Israeli professor of Arabic literature, argued. He added that the charges leveled against Hamas are fabricated. “I don’t believe Hamas collaborated with the Muslim Brotherhood to destroy Egypt. It is not in their interest to antagonize the Egyptian regime because if they do, they will lose an important source of fuel and foodstuffs in addition to the taxes they charge for these,” he wrote in Maariv. According to Kedar, the Egyptian regime was looking for an external enemy to blame for its failures and warned of the consequences. “If the regime becomes that harsh with Hamas, the group might start another wave of terrorist operations or might resort to Iran and this is not in Israel’s or Egypt’s interest.”

Those in favor…

The ruling was, however, seen as necessary by a number of Egyptian analysts. Security expert Colonel Khaled Okasha said the ruling was the right response to Hamas’s stance on Egypt since the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood. “Hamas preferred the Muslim Brotherhood over its relations with Egypt and they disregarded the will of the Egyptian people,” he said. “They acted as if they spoke on behalf of Egyptians when they called for Mursi’s return.”

Saeid al-Zant, head of the Center for Strategic Studies, argued that the verdict was late. “This verdict should have been passed as soon as it became known that Hamas took part in storming the prisons during the first days of the revolution,” he said. Professor of political science Gamal Salama pointed out that the verdict is not expected to have an effect on Hamas. “I think the only purpose of this ruling is to put pressure on Hamas so that it would stop interfering in Egypt’s domestic affairs,” he explained. The liberal Free Egyptians Party issued a statement welcoming the ruling as an important step in the war on terrorism. “It is time for everyone who plotted against Egypt to be punished and for everyone to know that Egypt will not be intimidated by extremist groups.” The statement downplayed the impact of the ban on the relationship between Egyptians and Palestinians. “The Egyptian and Palestinian people have historical relations that will not be affected by the terrorist activities of this group which falsely claims that it represents Palestinians,” the statement added.

On the official level, Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy stressed that the ban on Hamas will not affect Egypt’s role in Palestinian reconciliation. Fahmy refused to comment on the ruling in respect of the independence of the judiciary. “The law is being implemented,” he said. “And no one is to threaten Egypt’s national interests, whether Hamas or anyone else.” Fahmy also stressed that Egyptian sentiments towards the Palestinian people remain unchanged. “We consider the Palestinians our brothers.”

Does Egypt’s Hamdeen Sabahi stand a chance in elections?

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/02/23/Does-Egypt-s-Hamdeen-Sabahi-stand-a-chance-in-the-presidency-race-.html

“If your wish is that I run for president, then I will abide by it,” said Hamdeen Sabahi addressing a group of revolutionary youths who cheered upon hearing his final decision: “I, the citizen Hamdeen Sabahi, have decided to fight the battle.” Sabahi had for a long time been hesitant to join the presidential race and had even declared his willingness to support army chief Abel Fattah al-Sisi if his electoral platform is in line with the goals of the revolution. However, after pressure from several youth and revolutionary groups, he has decided run.

The Revolution’s Candidate Campaign, whose goal is to support a presidential candidate who best represents the demands of the January 25 Revolution, played a major role in encouraging Sabahi to stay in the race, a fact that he himself mentions in the press conference in which he announced his intention to run for president. “By the will of the youths, Hamdeen Sabahi is the revolution’s candidate,” read the campaign banners distributed across Egypt as soon as Sabahi announced his decision.

Sabahi rallies support

“Sabahi is the most suitable person for this stage,” said campaign coordinator Amr Badr. “He has no links to Mubarak’s regime or the Muslim Brotherhood and he is civilian and not from the military. Plus, he has a long history of struggle for freedom and he really believes in democracy.”

Badr added that Sabahi’s platform is one that prioritizes the poor and that is why millions voted for him in the previous 2012 presidential elections. Badr noted that neither Sisi nor Sami Anan, former chief of staff of the Egyptian army and a potential presidential candidate, will achieve the goals of the revolution. “Both are an extension of the regimes of Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood. They will not meet the demands of the people.” The campaign’s views were echoed by George Ishak, co-founder of the anti-Mubarak Egyptian Movement for Change (Kefaya).  “Hamdeen Sabahi is the one whose platform is in compliance with the goals of the January 25 and June 30 revolutions,” he said in the same press conference in which Sabahi announced his candidacy.

Talaat Fahmy, secretary general of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, says that Sabahi’s presidential bid will give civilian parties the opportunity to rally around a non-military candidate. “This strengthens the democratic process and creates real competition between different parties,” he said, adding that the army should focus on maintaining national security. Fahmy added that Sabahi’s strongest point is his “known support for the working class.”

Sabahi supporters back Sisi

However, not everyone is on board.

The presidential candidate has lost the backing of two of his formerly most ardent supporters who played a major role in his previous campaign—director Khaled Youssef and Abdel Hakim Abdel Nasser, son of late president Gamal Abdel Nasser. Youssef, who has recently declared his support for Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, argued that Sabahi’s announcement was not an official one since it had not yet been endorsed by the Egyptian Popular Current, which Sabahi chairs.

“The party’s board of trustees has to announce the candidacy in order for it to be official,” Youssef said in a TV interview. “Sabahi’s announcement was only an emotional response to pressure by youths who were present at the press conference.” That is why, Youssef explained, Sabahi noted that he has made “the personal decision” to run for president.

Even though the party later announced its official support for Sabahi, Youssef expressed his personal objection. “We have all agreed that for the four years that follow the June 30 revolution, we should not open the door for divisions and should, instead, focus on reconstructing the state and fighting terrorism,” he said. “This is not the time for political competition.” Youssef stressed the necessity of supporting Sisi at this stage: “We need to back one single candidate so that we don’t jeopardize our unity and this candidate is Abdel Fatah al-Sisi.”

Abdel Hakim Abdel Nasser said he saw Sabahi’s decision as a purely emotional one since it is clear that the Egyptian people want Sisi to be their leader. “Sisi is the people’s hero because he responded to their demands on June 30,” he said in an interview. In response to criticism about changing his stance, Abdel Nasser stressed that he did not abandon Sabahi as some claim, but that circumstances have changed. “Sisi was not a presidential candidate back in 2012 and had he been, I would have voted for him,” he said. “But after June 30, he risked his life and defied the U.S. in order to side with the people. He is the most suitable man for this stage.”

The National Salvation Front, the main opposition bloc against the Muslim Brotherhood of which Sabahi’s Egyptian Popular Current is a co-founder and a leading member, has not officially announced who it will support. However, initial statements by its leading members hint that backing Sabahi is quite unlikely. Mohammad al-Orabi, former foreign minister and current chairman of the Congress Party, argued that Sabahi is not qualified to become president and will not be able to solve Egypt’s problems as far as foreign policy is concerned. Orabi added that the front leaders had earlier agreed not to field a candidate and to only monitor the performance of the government. Amr Ali, member of the Free Egyptians Party, another member in the front, said that Sabahi’s ideologies are different from the rest of the parties in the front. “The parties in the front are liberal while Sabahi adopts socialist ideologies,” he said. “Besides, most of the front’s parties are more inclined to backing Sisi.” Hossam al-Kholy, assistant secretary general of al-Wafd Party, a member of the front, also cited ideological differences as the main reason for not preferring to support Sabahi. Kholy objected to referring to Sabahi as “the revolution’s candidate.” “Not everyone who had been to Tahrir Square would be a representative of the revolution,” he said. “Nobody has the right to monopolize the revolution.”

Candidacy causes divisions

Sabahi’s intention to run for president caused a serious rift in the ranks of the Tamarod Movement, the group behind the signature collection campaign that triggered the June 30, 2013 protests and the subsequent ouster of Islamist president Mohammad Mursi. While Tamarod officially supports Sisi’s candidacy, several of its senior members declared their support for Sabahi. His fifty supporters from group the issued a statement explaining the reason for their decision.

“We the undersigned support freedom fighter Hamdeen Sabahi for his struggle against corruption throughout the regimes of Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood, for a political agenda that adheres to the goals of the January 25 and June 30 revolutions, and for his prioritization of social justice,” read the statement. Tamarod co-founders Mohammad Abdel Aziz and Hassan Shahin were among the signatories. Their membership in the group was reportedly frozen following the move. The group’s third co-founder Mahmoud Badr said Abdel Aziz and Shahin have the right to voice their opinion but as individuals, not representatives of the group. “Tamarod has officially announced its full support for Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, therefore those adopting a different viewcannotspeak in the movement’s name,” he wrote in a statement. Tamarod spokesman Mohammad Nabawi accused Sabahi of causing a split in the movement by inviting some of its senior members to the press conference in which he announced his intention to run for president. “Sabahi introduced Abdel Aziz and Shahin in the press conference as senior members of Tamarod which made it sound like the movement is supporting him while he knows very well that we support Sisi,” he said in a TV interview. Nabawi accused Khaled al-Qadi, member of Tamarod’s politburo and one of the Sahabi supporters, of allowing members of the Egyptian Popular Current to infiltrate the movement.

Sabahi’s candidacy was met with objection by groups such as the April 6 Youth Movement and Revolutionary Socialists known for their stance against the army and particularly against Sisi. Sherif al-Rubi, member of the April 6 politburo, said the movement will not support Sabahi because of his hesitation. “One time, he says he will support Sisi, then another time he decides to run for president,” he said. Mohammad Hassan, another member of the movement, said he thinks it is likely Sabahi might withdraw in the last minute to leave the stage for Sisi. “By stressing that his presidential bid is a personal decision, he left the door open for himself to withdraw and support Sisi,” he said. “We cannot trust Sabahi.” Hassan’s statement, however, came before the Egyptian Popular Current’s official decision to back Sabahi.

Mahmoud Ezzat, member of the Revolutionary Socialists politburo, said the movement will not back Sabahi, also citing also his reluctance to make a decision earlier. “Sabahi’s popularity decreased remarkably owing to his stances on the military,” he added. “Right now he does not represent the January 25 Revolution.”

‘Bomb in the bedroom?’ Egypt’s new anti-Brotherhood divorce fatwa explained

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/02/08/Egypt-s-latest-fatwa-Divorce-if-your-wife-belongs-to-the-Muslim-Brotherhood-.html

“If a man discovers that his wife belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood, he should divorce her,” said preacher Mazhar Shahin in the show he presents in one of the private Egyptian satellite channels. “It is like having a bomb sleep in your own bedroom,” he added.

In this case, Shahin explained, the wife should be given the chance to sever all ties with the Brotherhood, but if she refuses, the husband has to divorce her. Shahin, who is also the imam of the Omar Makram Mosque in Tahrir Square and is known as “the imam of the revolution,” attributed his fatwa to the “jurisprudence of priorities” in Islam, through which, he argued, it becomes obvious that Egypt takes priority over individuals.

“If the interests of my country contradict those of my wife, I would definitely choose my country,” he noted. “A man can find many other women to marry, but there is only one Egypt.”

Belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood, however, does not mean the wife should be stripped of her financial rights, according to Shahin, who stressed that the divorce has to “comply with God’s laws.” The fatwa, Shahin said, also gives the right to any woman who finds out that her husband belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood to seek divorce.

Lesser of two evils

For Shahin, divorce is considered the lesser of two evils for the wife because otherwise the husband might report her to the police. “It is better for her to end up divorced than to end up in jail.” Shahin was referring to the case of a man who reported his wife to State Security for belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood.

In his complaint, the husband said that he only found out his wife is a Brotherhood member after Islamist President Mohammad Mursi came to power. “After the Brotherhood was toppled, the group started assigning her missions,” the complaint added. “That is why she traveled to the United Kingdom and Germany.”

The husband said that he decided to report her after she started putting pressure on him to join the Muslim Brotherhood and presented pictures of her in London doing the four-fingered salute, which declares solidarity with the victims of the Islamist sit-in that was dispersed by security forces.

Taking advantage

The husband also accused the wife of taking advantage of her position as a teaching assistant in Cairo University to incite students to demonstrate against the Egyptian state.

Dar al-Iftaa, the body officially in charge of issuing fatwas, promptly declared that Shahin’s words constitute a “personalopinion” rather than a fatwa. “The reason Shahin stated for the divorce is not one of those mentioned in Islamic law,” said the statement issued by Dar al-Iftaa. “As for the possible involvement of the husband or the wife in terrorist activities, this is to be determined through investigations.” Sheikh Magdi Ashour, head of the Fatwa Committee at Dar al-Iftaa, argued that Shahin is a mosque imam, therefore “not qualified to issue fatwas.” Ashour added that Dar al-Iftaa has always been keen on preserving the unity of the family and that is why it is careful with fatwas concerning divorce.

“Plus, not all members of the Muslim Brotherhood were involved in destructive activities, so it is not possible to issue such a general fatwa” he added in a TV interview. “Divorce, then, becomes permissible if being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood is detrimental to the safety of the family.”

Outside the mosque

Minister of Islamic Endowments Mohamed Mokhtar Gomaa called Shahin’s fatwas “political” and not religious, hence is not under the ministry’s jurisdiction. “The ministry has the right to take to task preachers who violate the rules while delivering sermons in mosques,” he said in a press statement. “But Shahin said that outside the mosque, so it is an opinion only he is responsible for.”

Shain’s fatwa was met with indignation by Islamist parties. Laila Samy, member of the Higher Committee of al-Wasat Party, known for its close links to the Muslim Brotherhood, accused Shahin of inciting hatred against “citizens who are now paying for their stance against the ‘coup,’” she wrote in reference to the ouster of president Mohammad Mursi, considered a military coup by pro-Muslim Brotherhood factions.

Samy described Mazhar as “another of the coup sheikhs who do not mind bringing about the disintegration of society to serve their interests.”

Samy expressed her shock as Shahin’s “recklessness” when it comes to a “grave matter” like divorce. “He is simply calling upon husbands to divorce their wives. He doesn’t mind ruining entire families.”

Tampering

The ultra-conservative al-Nour Party, which supported the ouster of Mursi and took part in the subsequent road map, considered the fatwa to have “tampered with religious laws.” Party spokesman Sherif Taha said the fatwa increases divisions in the Egyptian society under the pretext of patriotism.

“Involving love for one’s country in this matter is a type of manipulation that has unfortunately become prevalent in the political scene nowadays,” he said. Islamic researcher Sheikh Mohamed Teleima argued that all women who are against the “coup” are now suffering and that Shahin’s fatwa is part of the price they are paying. “My wife is a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and I am proud of that,” he added.

Teleima addressed a question to Shahin and “other issuers of disastrous fatwas,” as he put it.

“What then is the fatwa that can be issued about women who danced in front of strangers?” in reference to women dancing in front of polling stations on the day of the referendum on the post-Muslim Brotherhood constitution as an expression of approval for the new draft and the current Egyptian government.

Objections to the fatwa also came from secular figures known for their stance against the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt’s top political Bassem Youssef said that the fatwa is not really different from others issued by the Muslim Brotherhood against their opponents. “This is exactly like saying that liberals are not going to heaven,” he said in a TV interview.

Manipulation

“People against the Brotherhood are now manipulating religion exactly like Brotherhood members and supporters used to do before. This is hysteria!” Youssef said that while the general discourse is about unity, a fatwa like this will only create more rifts.“You can’t just call upon husbands to divorce their wives or wives to seek divorces because of belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood,” he said.

The April 6 Youth Movement issued a statement condemning Shahin’s fatwa and likening his stances to those of “the sultan’s preachers” throughout history. “The sultan’s preacher would issue fatwas that serve the interests of the ruler because currying favor with the authorities becomes his topmost priority.”

The statement added that even though Shahin was called “the imam of the revolution,” he turned out to have been using the revolution to be in the limelight. “There are many like you who we used to respect and who we thought are real revolutionaries, but they are in reality taking advantage of the revolution in order to be close to those in power at the expense of morals and principles and even religion,” the statement concluded.

In response to the harsh criticism to which he was subjected, Shahin said his words were taken out of context, arguing that it was obvious he meant wives who are involved in terrorist activities.

Female terrorists

“If the wife prepares Molotov cocktails, raises her children to hate the army and the police, curses Egypt and steps over the Egyptian flag, and is happy when other Egyptians are killed, she becomes dangerous to the family,” he said in a TV interview. Shahin explained that this applies to any woman who engages in terrorism regardless of her affiliation. “I did not mean that difference in political views justifies divorce,” he added.

In another interview, Shahin said that if he were in this position, he would definitely divorce his wife. “I will not sit still while my wife is out there burning down the country,” he said. On hisFacebook page, Shahin explained the logic behind his fatwa. “If a man has the right to divorce his wife if she betrays him, then what about betraying the country?” he asked. “If betraying a spouse is a sin, betraying one’s country is the gravest of sins.”

Even though Shahin was the center of the controversy and the recipient of all criticism, he was not the only scholar to issue this kind of fatwa. Professor of Comparative Jurisprudence at al-Azhar University Souad Saleh said that Muslim men should not marry women who belong to the Muslim Brotherhood and called upon men who find out their fiancées are from the Brotherhood to break off the engagement.

“Marrying a woman from the Muslim Brotherhood will produce a new generation of terrorists because she will instill her violent ideas into the minds of her children,” she said in a TV interview. Saleh explained that the relationship between husband and wife should be based on “love and compassion” as stated in the Quran.

“This is not the case with Brotherhood women who incite murder and destabilize society,” she added, stressing that her fatwa is supported by evidence from religion.

Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis: Egypt’s own al-Qaeda?

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/2014/02/01/Ansar-Bayt-al-Maqdis-Egypt-s-own-al-Qaeda-.html

The name Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis has been associated with almost every terrorist attack that hit Egypt after the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood, including the attempt on the life of the interior minister, the bombing of National Security headquarters in Mansoura and Cairo, the shooting down of a military helicopter in the Sinai Peninsula, and, most recently, the assassination of a senior security official. The group’s keenness to claim responsibility for each operation it carries out and its pledge to carry out more as part of what it calls “the battle for avenging the Muslims of Egypt” raised more question marks about what its real objectives are, how and where it originated, and what links, if any, it could possibly have with al-Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood, or any other militant and/or Islamist groups.

Based on the statements it has so far issued, the attacks mainly target police and army facilities and personnel. In one of those statements, the group lists the reasons why it labels the police and army as “apostates” and why, accordingly, it is a religious duty to declare war against them. According to one of those statements, entitled “A message to police and army officers and their families,” the police and the army are “fighting whoever attempts to apply Islamic law, “joining forces with the liberals and seculars,” “empowering a secular government that does not rule according to God’s laws,” “protecting a constitution that permits what God has forbidden and forbids what God has permitted” and “supporting Christians and Jews against Muslims under the pretext of fighting terrorism.” In the same statement, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis called upon police and army officers to quit their jobs or else suffer the consequences and upon their families to help them “save their lives and honor their religion.” In another statement, entitled “Operation ‘Right of Vengeance,’” Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis makes clear it will not target civilians as long as they do not take to the streets in support of the police and the army. “We are asking you not to go out to support apostasy and injustice,” read the statement. “If you stay at home, we promise that you’ll be safe.” In addition to the statements it is in the habit of issuing following each attack, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis also released a video that features the firing of the missile which downed the military helicopter and claimed the lives of five Egyptian officers. In the last statement it issued to claim responsibility for the assassination of the deputy interior minister and head of the Interior Ministry’s Technical Department General Mohammad Saeid, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis warned that defense minister, now potential presidential candidate, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Interior Minister Mohammad Ibrahim are next. “Retaliation is imminent and God’s will shall prevail,” said the statement.

Al-Qaeda-linked?

Although Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis is always referred to in the media as “al-Qaeda-linked” and “al-Qaeda-inspired,” there is no evidence of the group being an off-shoot of al-Qaeda. One of the few links so far was established by former militant and founder of the Islamic Jihad in Egypt Nabil Naeim, who said that the group originated in Gaza then started operating in Egypt following the 2011 Revolution. According to Naeim, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis is funded by the Muslim Brotherhood through a deal with the Brotherhood’s Deputy Supreme Guide Khairat al-Shater that was mediated by Mohammad al-Zawahiri, the brother of al-Qaeda chief. “Hamas is also part of the deal, according to an appeasement deal sponsored by ousted President Mohammad Mursi in return for cooperation with the Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis,” Naeim said in a press interview. Naeim added that the leader of the original Gaza group received his “takfiri” education from Sheikh Abdel Meguid al-Shazli, who is also the mentor of both Shater and Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohammad Badei. According to Naeim, the Muslim Brotherhood supplies Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis with weapons “through Libya and the Gaza tunnels.” Although al-Qaeda link is not the center of attention at the moment, the Muslim Brotherhood link is the one several parties seem to agree on. Expert on Islamist groups Sameh Eid called Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis “the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood” and said that Shater had threatened Sisi with “escalation in Sinai and the targeting of the Egyptian army.” Eid added that the Muslim Brotherhood was planning on forming its own militia. “This militia was to be made up of Hamas militants, youths from the Brotherhood, and fighters trained in Afghanistan,” he said in a TV interview. Medhat Naguib, head of al-Ahrar Party, argued that Shater’s aim of forming this militia was “having a deterrent power against the state to guarantee remaining in power.” He added that militants granted a presidential pardon when Mursi came to power played an important role in the establishment of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis: “That explains why they moved to Sinai right after they were released,” he said. Naguib established another al-Qaeda link when he said that member of Ansar Bayt al-Magdes were trained by al-Qaeda operatives in Sinai. “This was done based on coordination between Mursi and al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri,” he added. Naguib argues that another proof of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’s affiliation to the Muslim Brotherhood is the group’s rejection of a merging request by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. “This shows that they only want to terrorize the Egyptian people,” he explained. Mohammad Hamza, head of Middle East Forum for Strategic Studies, finds the statements issued by Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis proof enough of their Brotherhood connection. “All the group’s statements show that they are avenging the Brotherhood,” he said.

Similar to al-Qaeda link, both the Brotherhood and Hamas links do not seem to be supported by concrete evidence. In his article “Can Egypt Handle Ansar Bayt al Maqdis?”, published in The National Interest, David Barnett expresses his surprise at the Egyptian government’s insistence on accusing the Muslim Brotherhood of carrying out all terrorist attacks even though Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis claims responsibility every time and its designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization immediately after one of those attacks. Barnett argues that in what it considers “an existential battle,” the Egyptian state finds justification for its continuous incrimination of the Muslim Brotherhood in a public opinion that blames the group for all the country’s ailments and he cites the example of a poll which revealed that only 6% of the Egyptian people believe that Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis are to blame for terrorist attacks. For Barnett, there has not been any proof of the link between the two groups. “The evidence presented thus far is tenuous, at best,” he wrote. “The command and control links that some Egyptian officials have suggested are unproven. And while ABM certainly has former members of the Muslim Brotherhood within its ranks, these are former members who specifically left because the Brotherhood was not, in their view, fully committed to offensive jihad.”

Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhari also came out to refute allegations of any link between Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. “Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis is not Palestinian at all,” he said in a press statement. Abu Zuhari slammed attempts at “fabricating a link between this Egyptian group and Gaza” and which he considered a means of “escaping from the problem and exporting the Egyptian crisis.” He also denied claims that the missile used for downing the Egyptian helicopter came from Gaza. “That was a Russian missile that any group in Sinai could get from the black market.” Abu Zuhari called upon the Egyptian media to stop the propagation of such false news. “This serves no one except the Israeli occupation,” he concluded.

The Square: Will Egyptians be banned from watching their revolution?

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/life-style/entertainment/2014/01/25/The-Square-Will-Egyptians-be-banned-from-watching-their-revolution-.html

A few days ago, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences announced its final list of nominations for the 2014 Oscars, with the Egyptian film “The Square” in the Best Documentary category. The nomination is the first of its kind since 1962, when Egyptian actor Omar al-Sharif was nominated for best supporting actor in “Lawrence of Arabia.” This year’s nomination was received with more controversy than joy, with heated debates about why “The Square” has not been screened in Egypt, and a state ban seeming like the most plausible explanation.

The film chronicles the events of the Egyptian revolution until the ouster of former President Mohammad Mursi through a laborer, an actor, and a Muslim Brotherhood member. It was scheduled to be screened in Dec. 2013 as part of the sixth edition of the Panorama of European Film, held annually in Cairo, but was cancelled on the same day. “We have been working very hard to give the film an Egyptian premiere,” said a statement by the Panorama organizers following the cancellation. “Getting the permit to screen the film was very difficult and although we were granted authorization, the producers of the film wanted to take the time to work on a wholly Arabic translated version for the Egyptian audience rather than screening the film in its international version. This was however not completed and shipped on time.”

The film’s director, Egyptian-American Jehane Noujaim, has a different story. According to her, an official request to screen the film in Egypt was submitted to the censorship authority. “We never received a reply,” she said. Noujaim insisted that the screening of the film was never approved: “What you need in order to show the film in a theater and in public spaces for large audiences is an official letter allowing you to do so. They have not issued that letter.” Although at the time the censorship authority did not respond, the fact that the film was not screened was considered a confirmation of reports that it is officially banned. That is how the international press dealt with it as soon as the Academy nominations were out. This was obvious in headlines such as “The Square: an Egyptian Oscar nominee that won’t be shown in Egypt” in The Guardian, “Banned at home and noticed by Oscars” in the New York Times, and “Oscar nod for banned Egyptian film” in the Sydney Morning Herald.

“I don’t know her and I have never seen her before,” was the response Ahmed Awwad, head of the Egyptian Censorship Authority, to Noujaim’s statement about the request to screen her film. “We only received a request from the organizers of the Panorama of European Film so that the film can be screened in that festival, but the copy to be screened did not arrive on time from abroad,” he said. “All the rumors about banning the film are not true. We did not receive any official request by the film producers and if we do, we will look into it and take all the necessary procedures according to the law,” Awwad added.

Noujaim said the censorship authority has recently asked that another screening request be submitted, adding that the film will be welcomed this time. “We were very happy to hear that,” she said. “Screening the film in Egypt is our ultimate goal and we are ready to engage in all sorts of dialogue with the censorship authority and to answer all their questions.”

In the midst of contradicting statements, speculation is rife as to why the documentary, whose rights were acquired by Netflix – where it is currently streaming – would be banned in Egypt in the first place. Journalist Ola al-Shafei said the film’s content “can be seen as unfair” to the Egyptian army in the way it highlights violations committed by the military when in power, while not focusing at all on the role the army later played in fighting the Brotherhood and restoring stability. Shafei said the new dangers to which Egypt is exposed – such as international conspiracies, internal conflict and terrorist attacks – have changed the reality on the ground, and consequently changed the angle from which the army is to be seen, which was not made clear in the film. Journalist Atef Bishara objects to considering the film a means of documenting the Egyptian revolution because, to him, it contains several inaccuracies. “For example, it is mentioned more than once in the film that the army struck a deal with the Muslim Brotherhood while there is no evidence of that,” he wrote. “Instead of investigating, the filmmakers just took information from social networking websites.”

For film critic Tarek al-Shennawi, it is not the content as much as the message of “The Square” that matters. “The film encourages the people to continue their revolution,” he said. “And I think that is why the film was not screened in Egypt.” Activist Aida al-Kashef, who appears in the film, said “The Square” revives memories that could cause more uprisings. “The film reminds Egyptians that the demands for which they started the revolution, like freedom and dignity, haven’t been met, and that the reality we’re living now confirms this,” she said. For singer and activist Ramy Essam, who also appears in the film, it gives Egyptian youths more hope for the future. “The film reminds the people that despite the obstacles the revolution is facing, the younger generations should still believe in their ability to change reality after they conquered their fears,” he said.

Regardless of the reasons for the alleged ban and how official it is, Noujaim sees the Oscar nomination as one of the best means to fight the state’s attempts at severing the link between Egyptians and their memories, and she explicitly accused the army of that. “In Egypt, the military is trying to whitewash history. The film is banned in Egypt. The nomination gives it incredible attention and energy, and allows for the people back home to know that our story will continue to be heard,” she said.

The nomination, and the international fame it has already brought the film, is bound to place the Egyptian authorities in an awkward position if they insist on not screening it she added. “It is putting the film on an international stage, so that the authorities in Egypt are starting to get phone calls and questions about why the rest of the world is allowed to see this film about a crucially important chapter in Egyptian history, and it’s not being shown to the Egyptian people,” she said.

“The Square” won the Audience Award at the Sundance Film Festival in Jan. 2013, when it was presented as a work in progress. The updated version won the People’s Choice Documentary Award at the Toronto International Film Festival in September last year.

Egypt’s referendum between a sweeping ‘yes’ and a feeble ‘no’

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/01/15/Egypt-s-referendum-between-a-sweeping-yes-and-a-feeble-no-.html

A few days ago, a documentary entitled “Please Remember: January 14-15,” in reference to the date of the upcoming referendum on the new constitution, drafted after the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood rule, was released. The 12- minute long film features interviews with dozens of Egyptians from all over the country with all of them saying they will vote yes in the referendum, with the exception of one who will vote no and two who still need to read the amendments. The documentary was received with enthusiastic support by some and with extreme indignation by others.

For supporters of the new constitution, the film offered an authentic portrayal of Egyptians’ willingness to participate in what they see as a positive step towards democracy. In an article entitled “Sandra Nashaat… That a Girl,” journalist Ahmed Afifi heaps praise on the director, the young woman whose name is mentioned in the title, for her ability to reflect what Egyptians really want and to make all viewers want the same thing.

“She made us feel that we would not be true Egyptians if we do not vote ‘yes’ and do so zealously,” he wrote. “She made us say ‘yes’ even before referendum day. She extracted it from us without pressure and without propaganda. She made us feel the pleasure of ticking ‘yes’ in advance.”

Accurate expose or pure propaganda?

Critics of the film had a totally opposite view, for they viewed it as state-sponsored propaganda that intentionally avoided presenting both sides of the argument. Director Kamla Abu Zikri refused to call the work a documentary.
“It is cheerful and pleasant like a nice clip or a fascinating ad, but it cannot be called a documentary,” she wrote. “This is sheer propaganda and lacks the depth with which documentaries are characterized.”

Activist Wael Abbas simply tweeted, “To fans of Sandra Nashaat, do you remember Leni Riefenstahl?” he asked, referring to the famous German director who was an integral part of the Nazi propaganda machine.

Nashaat refused to categorize her documentary as propaganda and insisted that she did not pick the people she interviewed and that Egyptians across the country will vote for the constitution.

“I found overwhelming approval of the constitution,” she said in an interview. “I was not trying to mobilize the people. I was simply reflecting public opinion as it is and as you could see only one person supported Mursi’s legitimacy compared to hundreds who want stability and who see the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.”

The majority of civilian powers, which played an important role in mobilizing the June 30 protests that toppled the Muslim Brotherhood and many of whose leaders were members of the committee that drafted the new constitution, declared their support for a yes vote.

Political leaders: constitution imperfect, but step in the right direction

Mohammad Abul Ghar, head of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party and member of the drafting committee concurred that the constitution “is not the ideal outcome of the Jan. 25 Revolution,” yet added that it is “remarkable in terms of the rights and freedoms it grants to Egyptians.”

In a conference the party organized under the slogan “Supporting the Constitution,” Abul Ghar enumerated the advantages of the new constitution like freedom of faith, freedom of the press, gender equality, and the limitation of the president’s powers. The implementation of such articles, he noted, requires a powerful parliament that works on drafting the necessary legislations.

“That is why legislators have to represent the people because only then will the people be able to benefit from this constitution,” he concluded. Member parties of the National Salvation Front, the main opposition bloc against Muslim Brotherhood rule, similarly supported the new constitution.

Former presidential candidate and head of the Egyptian Popular Current Hamdeen Sabahi considers a yes vote “a renewal of confidence in the roadmap charted in the aftermath of the June 30 protests with the approval of the Egyptian people.”

Endorsing the constitution, he added, is a continuation of the path started on Jan. 25, 2011: “Those who will vote yes will be endorsing the text of the constitution as well as the revolutions of Jan. 25 and June 30, hence adding constitutional legitimacy to revolutionary legitimacy.”

Sabahi expected the freedoms and rights stated in the constitution to earn it a sweeping yes vote among the Egyptian population.

The Rebel movement, which started the signature collection campaign to topple Mursi, also declared its support for the constitution. “It is not a flawless constitution, but it is definitely better than 1971 and 2012,” the movement said in a statement in reference to the constitutions that were in force during the times of Mubarak and Mursi, respectively. The movement expressed its objection to an article that allows the trial of civilians before military courts, yet praised other articles it saw as a success.

“There are very good articles on social justice, rights and freedoms, and people with disabilities,” the statement added. “This constitution gives all segments of the Egyptian society their rights.”

Civilian powers were joined by the ultra-conservative al-Nour Party, which took part in the roadmap that followed Mursi’s ouster.

Despite disagreements with civilian committee members over articles involving Islamic law, party chairman Yunes Makhioun called for a yes vote adding that “Egypt is going through a critical time, the time of to be or not to be,” he said in a statement. In response to reservations about crossing out an article that offered a strict interpretation of Islamic law, from a Sunni point of view, Makhioun argued that the constitution is not expected to be perfect. “This is a work of human beings after all, so it has to have negative and positive sides,” he explained. “Plus each party had to display some flexibility so that we can move on.”

Sheikh Yasser Borhami, a prominent leader of the Salafi movement in Egypt and member of al-Nour Party, warned that three disasters will take place if the constitution is not approved. “One is the collapse of the state, the economy, and security; two is the division of the army; and three is foreign intervention,” he said in a conference held in support of the constitution in Alexandria.

Government, religious officials weigh in

Approval of the constitution took a more official shape as interim president Adli Mansour openly praised the new draft through urging the people to vote in order “to fulfill our revolution the way we wanted it with a constitution that marks the first step to a civil, democratic state.”

One day before, Minister of Defense and Army Chief Abdel Fattah al-Sisi did the same when he linked the new constitution to the Jan. 25 and June 30 revolutions and urged Egyptians to make a change similar to the one they made on those two days through taking part in the referendum. He also praised the constitution saying, “it achieved real balance, harmony, and justice.”

The constitution also acquired religious leverage as senior Muslim and Christian clerics took part in the campaign supporting the constitution.

Former Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa stressed that approving the constitution “will show the entire world the difference between Egyptians and those who seek to shed Egyptian blood” while Coptic Pope Tawadros II argued that the passing of the constitution “is bound to bring Egypt a lot of blessings.”

‘Strong Egypt Party’ vocalizes strong opposition

Not all factions that took part in the June 30 protests against the Muslim Brotherhood approve the constitution, though. The Strong Egypt Party, founded by former Muslim Brotherhood member and former presidential candidate Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh announced the group’s boycott of the referendum after declaring earlier that it would vote no. In a statement it issued less than 24 hours before the first day of the referendum, the party voiced its objection to what followed the ouster of Mursi by the military.

“We object to the bloodshed, the detentions, and the violations and the way they deepened divisions and destabilized security,” said the statement. “And we object to the return of Mubarak’s repressive regime.”

The statement added that the referendum is being held in “an atmosphere that violates the most basic internationally acknowledged democratic rules,” in reference to the arrest of several of party members as they were campaigning against the constitution.

The April 6 movement announced its boycott of the referendum, yet proclaimed its intention to monitor it in order “to issue reports that expose violation and evaluate the referendum process as a whole,” according to the movement’s statement. The decision comes in defiance of the Higher Elections Committee which banned members of the movement from monitoring the poll.

The movement, however, called upon Egyptians to vote no to the constitution, citing its objection to 20 articles in the new draft. “The constitution gives the president and the military a lot of powers and allows the trial of civilians before military courts,” said Khaled al-Masry, member of the April 6 politburo.

The pro-Muslim Brotherhood National Alliance in Support of Legitimacy urged Egyptians to boycott the referendum and stage protests against “a new massacre to complete the usurpation of the homeland,” as the group said in a statement. “Do not listen to the leaders of the coup, for blood is dripping from their mouths,” the statement added.

 

The Fahita affair: Egyptian puppetry and terrorism

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/variety/2014/01/07/The-Fahita-affair-Egyptian-puppetry-and-terrorism.html

“Egypt’s latest terror suspect: The popular felt-and-yarn puppet Abla Fahita,” read a Washington Post headline. It was referring to a complaint filed against a cellphone provider for allegedly using the popular character in an internet ad to send coded messages that instruct Muslim Brotherhood members to carry out terrorist operations.

There have been similarly sarcastic headlines in the international press, such as “Egyptian puppet Abla Fahita accused of terrorism” in the Sydney Morning Herald, “Silly season in Egypt: Hounding the Muppet Brotherhood” in The Economist, and “Egyptian puppet called terrorist mouthpiece” in the New York Times.

This gives an insight into the general reaction to the investigation into the alleged collaboration between Vodafone and the Brotherhood, now officially designated a terrorist group. Such sarcasm is also apparent in the local media, and especially on social networking websites.

Activists have posted pictures of local and international puppets declaring their support for Fahita. There is a cartoon in which an interrogator shows Fahita a photo of Kermit, the frog from the Muppet Show, and accuses her of receiving funding from an American puppet. The hashtag #freefahita has been created on Twitter.

Sarcasm, however, is giving way to alarm as fears grow over the ominous nature of such a step by the authorities. “It says a lot about the patriotism frenzy we’re in,” said political analyst Ziad Akl of Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies. “There’s definitely a sentiment of fascist nationalism that you either subscribe to, or face being labeled a traitor.”

He added: “We’re laughing about the puppet now, but replace the puppet with anything else – another symbol, another figure – and the media can manipulate and do anything with it in this climate.”

British-Egyptian blogger Sarah Carr wrote in her entry “Laughing till we cry”: “The current mood is almost fascistic in its reverence for the state and for state hegemony and for state opponents to be eliminated.”

In her article “Egypt adds puppetry to its enemy of the state list,” published in Foreign Policy, Katelyn Fossett wrote that the government is especially clamping down on popular satirists. She gave the example of Bassem Youssef, whose TV show was terminated for making fun of the military. Fossett sees the “the puppet witch-hunt” as a continuation of that policy. “It hasn’t been an easy year for satire in Egypt,” she wrote.

The Interior Ministry’s media department published on its Facebook page a statement that “unintelligible codes and symbols have been published on Abla Fahita’s pages on social networking websites in violation of the law.” The statement added that even though it is still not known whether those codes and symbols are real, the creators of the puppet have to be arrested and questioned.

The former deputy head of general intelligence, Tharwat Gouda, said Fahita is “American-made,” and is “a code channel” used by the Brotherhood and the revolutionary April 6 Youth Movement “to coordinate acts of violence against the police and the army and for mobilization.

“Gouda added that Khairat al-Shater, the imprisoned Brotherhood deputy supreme guide, has given instructions from jail to members and supporters of the groups to use Fahita to send coded messages “to wreak havoc in the country.”

Journalist Mohamed Ramzy asked in his article “Abla Fahita and cryptography”: “Is it possible that the media can be used by secret organizations for sending coded messages?” He did not answer the question, but said the majority of prominent American TV networks and newspapers are owned by Jews and Zionists.

“There is no doubt that there is a close relationship between the tycoons of Western media and secret Zionist organizations, on top of which are Masonic organizations which are known for using symbols and cryptic messages and these are well-connected with most if not all secret organizations that are known and unknown to us,” he wrote.

Vodafone has issued a statement denying all allegations listed in the complaint, refusing to get involved in “the details of such irrational interpretations and accusations,” and calling the charges “mere imagination.” Vodafone spokesman Khaled Hegazy said: “I’m sad we’ve reached this level of thinking.”

Security forces make a comeback to Egyptian universities

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2013/12/19/Security-forces-make-a-comeback-to-Egyptian-universities.html

On Dec. 17, the Committee on Academic Freedom at the Middle East Studies Association of North America (MESA) drafted a letter addressed to Egyptian Prime Minister Hazem al-Beblawy. The letter aimed at expressing the association’s “grave concern” over the recent developments in several universities across the country with the state escalating its violent clampdown on student protests amid fears of a “worsening climate for free speech and peaceable assembly on university campuses in Egypt.” The letter listed three main incidents that render such concerns legitimate. The “worst” of the three incidents is the shooting and killing of freshman engineering student Mohammad Reda at Cairo University by security forces while he was on campus grounds coupled with the Ministry of Interior’s refusal to admit responsibility.

The second incident is the sentencing of 12 students from al-Azhar University in Cairo to 17 years each, a punishment that the association considers “draconian” since it was based on adding up the maximum penalty for all six crimes each of the students were charged with while they should have been handed the sentence for only the most serious of the crimes. The third incident is the storming of the campus of Zagazig University in the northern Egypt by security forces to disperse a sit-in staged by students to demand the release of 23 of their colleagues arrested the week before on charges of sabotage following on-campus clashes. The association called upon the prime minister to look into the three cases and take the necessary measures to see justice done and to make sure that universities remain a place where students can freely and safely express themselves as part of their citizenship rights. “The government of Egypt is responsible for protecting and upholding the rights of all of its citizens, including those who disagree with particular decisions made by the authorities and take to the streets to voice their opposition,” the letter said towards its conclusion. “Academic freedom and freedom of expression on university campuses are two of the most important of those rights in Egypt, where universities have historically played such a vital role in political and civic life.” The ministers of justice, education, and the interior as well as the rectors of Cairo, al-Azhar, and Zagazig universities were copied.

Clashes and student arrests have been ongoing in several other campuses and while many of the protests were initially organized by Islamists, especially the group called Students against the Coup, who call for the return of ousted President Mohammad Mursi, recent ones have started focusing on police brutality and fears of the return of security forces to university grounds. The first intervention by security forces on campus grounds was at al-Azhar upon the request of university rector Osama al-Abd who, according to a security statement, contacted Minister of Interior Mohammad Ibrahim to ask for immediate help to “protect lives and property” following Islamist students’ storming of the university administration building and taking al-Abd and many of the staff hostage.

After relative calm was restored, al-Abd still insisted that security forces remain. “There is no talk now about security forces leaving now,” he said as he toured campus to check the damages. “Not until things go back to normal.” Conflicting testimonies were reported about al-Azhar clashes. Ahmed Saleh, an Islamist activist and member of Students against the Coup said security forces were brutal and insisted that they attacked protestors before they took the demonstration outside campus grounds. “The government wants to muzzle our voices. They do not want to listen to the voice of freedom and truth,” he said. Interior Ministry spokesman Hani Abdel Latif denied Saleh’s allegations and stressed that the police exercised self-restraint even though the protestors started the violence with throwing stones from inside the campus. “They also attacked the police with Molotov cocktails. Protesters destroyed three police vehicles and injured several security personnel, in addition to burning private cars owned by university employees and staff members,” he added. Abdel Latif also noted that had the police not intervened, residents of the neighboring areas would have attacked the protestors anyway: “People are fed up with what they’re doing.”

Public outrage

Official responses to al-Azhar incidents did not spark as much public outrage as they did in the case of Cairo University’s Mohammad Reda who was shot dead. In a televised press conference, Minister of Interior Mohammad Ibrahim warned Egyptian students of being dragged into acts of violence. “I urge students to stay alert and not to be led astray by saboteurs,” he said. “I appeal to their sense of nationalism.” He called the protests in Egyptian universities “a conspiracy against Egypt” that aims at reversing the June 30 revolution and reinstating the Muslim Brotherhood rule. The minister refused to comment on Reda’s death, adding that the investigations would reveal the truth. The prosecutor general’s office then issued a press release stating that the type of gun that killed Reda was not used by security forces and that he was shot by other protestors. Minister of Higher Education Hossam Eissa supported those statements and stressed that the police around the university only use rubber bullets. He also said that the Muslim Brotherhood might be behind Reda’s death. “I don’t find it unlikely that the Muslim Brotherhood was involved in killing Reda.

They kill police and army officers all the time. They are trying to topple the state through attacking its most vital institutions,” he said in a TV interview. The reaction of Cairo University rector Gaber Nassar was different as he lashed out at the Ministry of Interior for using excessive violence in dispersing the protests and held security forces responsible for the death of Mohammad Reda. “We will not accept the Interior Ministry’s claims that security forces did not use gunshots because if they did not, they must tell us who did,” he said. “The Ministry of Interior attacked Cairo University. This is unacceptable. We are documenting all those attacks and will report them to the relevant bodies so that those who did wrong can be punished.” Nassar refuted the Interior Ministry’s claims that the protests were all staged by supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood: “Pro-Muslim Brotherhood protests did not exceed 100 students. The rest were against the Interior Ministry and those are expanding.” The university administration issued a statement supporting Nassar’s stance and accusing security forces of “crossing all lines.”

Security forces on university grounds

On-campus violence has also given rise to speculations about the possible return of security forces to university grounds, as was the case before the January 25 Revolution, and raised concerns among activists and academics alike. Revolution Youth Union and member of the politburo of the Revolutionary Forces Coalition Tamer al-Kadi said that the return of security forces to universities is bound to arouse suspicions about the Interior Ministry’s motives regarding academic freedom. “If it is about the safety of students, professors, and staff then there can be security affiliated to the university like court guards, who are affiliated to the Ministry of Justice,” he said. Mahmoud Radwan, head of the Alexandria University Student Union argued that the return of security forces to campuses will endow Muslim Brotherhood protests with legitimacy: “Students from civilian factions will also object to the return of security forces so Islamist students will find support.”

Hani al-Husseini, Cairo University professor and a leading member of the March 9 Movement for the Independence of Egyptian Universities, one of whose main goals was to end the intervention of the Ministry of Interior in academic activities, attributes a large part of the recent violence to what he calls “the provocative presence of the police inside and around campuses.” As for protests staged by Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers or clashes between Islamist and liberal students, he argues that “those do not usually go beyond some stone throwing and the university’s civilian security is capable of dealing with that.” On the other hand, Minster of Interior Mohammad Ibrahim has been reassuring all concerned parties that security forces would never go back to university campuses. “The presence of security forces on university grounds during the former regime had led to constant tension with students. We do not want to see this happen again now,” he stressed.

Release of Alexandria girls sparks more controversy

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2013/12/11/Release-of-Alexandria-girls-sparks-more-controversy.html

An Egyptian Misdemeanor Court of Appeals ordered the release on Dec. 7 of 21 female Islamist protestors whose jail sentences had stirred much controversy.

The 14 adults, who had each received 11 years and one month in jail, were handed a one-year suspended sentence.

The remaining seven minors, who were to be incarcerated in juvenile detention centers until the age of 18, are to be put on probation for three months.

The defendants, now known as the Alexandria Girls, were charged with sabotage, rioting and possession of weapons.

Even though the new verdict was greeted with considerable relief, it has caused nearly as much controversy as that triggered by the initial sentence, as questions are raised about the corresponding political messages.

Human rights organizations were the first to condemn the sentences as harsh and disproportionate.

Violating rights

The National Council for Motherhood and Childhood found the verdict to have flagrantly violated women’s right to protest, and demanded the immediate release of the 21 girls.

The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, and the Arab Centre for the Independence of the Judiciary, took the same stand.

The council and three organizations issued a joint statement questioning the independence of the judiciary, which is constantly subjected to “pressure by governmental authorities to best serve their needs.”

The statement added that “the country is in dire need of ending the use of the judiciary as a political tool and a weapon against the government’s political opponents.”

It accused the authorities of bringing back the police state that existed prior to the 2011 revolution.

For Azza al-Ashmawi, secretary general of the National Council for Motherhood and Childhood, the verdict meant that “no one will be safe from their iron fist.”

The fate of the girls is an example of how the government plans to “crush opposition,” she added.

Nasser Amin, head of the Arab Centre for the Independence of the Judiciary, attributed the verdict to the girls’ affiliation rather than an actual crime committed.

“The government is now arresting and accusing anyone who belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood, exactly as [former President Mohammad] Mursi did with his opponents,” he said.

‘Same old story’

The “same old story” is being repeated, and nothing has changed since the end of Islamist rule, Amin added.

Under the title “Egypt must immediately and unconditionally release women protesters,” an Amnesty International report condemned the Egyptian state for its “determination to punish dissent.”

Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui, Amnesty’s deputy director in the Middle East and North Africa, called the girls “prisoners of conscience” who had to be freed immediately.

“Instead of imprisoning peaceful protesters, authorities should be ensuring prompt, independent and impartial investigations into police abuse of protesters, reining in security forces, and upholding the right to freedom of peaceful assembly,” she said.

The domestic and international outrage sparked by the verdict was followed by a statement issued by the office of interim President Adly Mansour, and circulated to the press by his advisor for women’s affairs Sekina Fouad, in which the president pledged to intervene in the case only after all the legal procedures take their due course.

Mansour “will issue a full pardon to the Alexandria females after the final judicial process is completed,” Fouad said, adding that the case would still have to go through the courts of appeals and cassation.

While this statement was seen as an attempt to contain the crisis, it raised more questions about the independence of the judiciary and the president’s powers.

For Judge Ashraf Nada, head of the Cairo Court of Appeals, Mansour did not have the right to pardon the girls since they did not just violate the law that regulates protests.

“Those girls were arrested because they committed criminal offences, and they have to be punished accordingly,” Nada said in a TV interview.

The penal code, under which the girls were tried, allows the arrest of “terrorists” even if they did not engage in protests, the judge added, calling for the Brotherhood to be dealt with as “a terrorist group.”

According to the defense team, the girls should not have been arrested in the first place, since there was no evidence against them.

Ahmed al-Hamrawy, one of the lawyers, lashed out at the authorities for involving women in their attempts to eliminate opposition, a practice that, he said, had not existed before the revolution that toppled former President Hosni Mubarak.

“Even in Mubarak’s era there were morals. Egypt’s women and girls were a red line,” he told the court.

Hamrawy, however, was not unhappy with the new verdict. “The sentence is satisfying to a degree, and it has a humanitarian aspect,” he said, adding that the verdict will still be appealed until the 14 adults are fully acquitted.

A statement issued by the defense team, however, slammed the new verdict because “the girls are still guilty before the law and their future can be compromised.”

Justice, the statement added, will only be served when the girls are declared innocent of all charges against them.

The new verdict has led to debate as to whether the interim government is starting to soften its stance towards Islamists.

Kristen Chick, Cairo correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, said it is unlikely that other pro-Mursi supporters would be treated with the same leniency.

The girls’ case in particular gained the sympathy of most Egyptians, not only Islamists, due to the harshness of the sentences and the age and gender of the defendants, she added.

“Even Egyptians who agree with government claims that many Muslim Brotherhood protesters are terrorists found it hard to reconcile this rhetoric with the sight of teenagers who appeared in court fresh-faced, smiling, and yesterday, even holding pink roses,” Chick said.

Journalist and TV anchor Emad Adib said the Brotherhood “is the only group that is not happy about the release of the Alexandria girls. The girls were a card they played, and now this card is burnt.”

Military trials back to haunt Egyptian civilians

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2013/12/02/Military-trials-back-to-haunt-Egyptian-civilians.html

A few days ago, the 50-member committee in charge of drafting Egypt’s post-Islamist constitution approved article 174 that permits the “conditional” trial of civilians before military courts. Out of the 50 people, 30 approved the article, 11 rejected it, two abstained from voting, and 11 were absent. According to the article, civilians will only be tried by the military under very exceptional circumstances. These include attacking military facilities, vehicles, and staff as well as offences targeting military documents, classified information, and funds. Attacks on border areas and military zones also fall under the category of crimes against the military. The voting was followed by a heated debate in Egypt’s political circles and a protest was organized by activists in front of the Consultative Assembly’s headquarters, where the committee holds its sessions, calling for the controversial article and all articles deemed contrary to the demands of the Jan. 25 revolution to be crossed out of the draft.

The protest was called for and led by “No to Military Trials,” a group of lawyers and activists that was formed in 2011 following a series of arrests and trials of civilians by the military when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces was the de facto ruler of Egypt. Following the approval of the article, the movement issued a statement detailing the reasons for its objection which it started by accusing the committee of repeating the mistakes of the Muslim Brotherhood and even drafting an article that is more draconian than its Islamist predecessor because it expands the powers of military courts. While the 2012 constitution stated that the military judiciary is in charge of handling crimes that involve army officers and personnel, the 2013 draft adds the phrase “and those considered as such,” which, the statement argues, would include civilians working in military institutions as well as students in military schools and colleges. The 2012 constitution states that civilians can only be tried before military courts if involved in crimes that harm the Armed Forces and that such crimes are to be determined by the law whereas the new articles broaden the spectrum of these crimes to include all facilities owned by the Armed Forces and given the number of businesses the Armed Forces owns and runs, the article would apply to a large number of facilities. Lawyer and activist Zyad al-Eleimy commented on this point: “Article 174 means that if I get into a fight in one of the gas stations owned by the army, I face military trial; if I crash into a truck loaded with pasta or water manufactured by army factories, I face military trial.”

Saying ‘no’

The No to Military Trials statement also notes that the article puts at risk Egyptians living in border cities and close to military zones and rules out the public disclosure of the military budget. The statement adds that the article curbs freedom of the press through making information about the army confidential: “This way the army would have the right to bring to a military court any journalist who attempts to make the truth known to the people and this happened before.” No to Military Trials also voiced its objection to the first phrase of the article, the same as in the 2012 constitution, and which states that “the military judiciary is independent.” This, the group asserts, is a contradiction in terms since military courts are by definition affiliated to the Armed Forces and report to the Minister of Defense: “The court pledges allegiance to the army and this is contrasted to the concept of the independence of the judiciary.” Eleimy draws attention to another issue that makes the trial unfair by definition: “It is a trial in which the judge and the plaintiff are one and the same person.”

A large portion of activities vehemently rejected the article and criticized members of the committee who approved it, especially those among them who were generally regarded as revolutionary. Activist and blogger Alaa Abdel Fattah, previously accused of inciting violence against the military and known for his refusal to acknowledge the military’s right to interrogate him, said that the new article proves “that the army is determined to bring back the Mubarak regime.” Abdel Fattah explained that military trials “offer a pretext for torturing and humiliating civilians” and creates of the army “a state within a state.” He also accused anyone who approves of the article to be “a traitor to the revolution and the people.” Activist Mosaad Abu Fagr, who represents the Sinai Peninsula in the drafting committee, called the article “twisted” and insisted that it should not have been considered in the first place: “I don’t care if the whole world votes for it. Nothing will make it right.” After rejecting the article, Abu Fagr withdrew from the session as the committee went ahead with the voting and announced he was considering withdrawing from the committee altogether. Mohammad Abul Ghar, head of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party and one of the committee members who voted against the article, said that he was against amending the article to specify the circumstances under which civilians can stand trial before military courts and demanded that the article be crossed out altogether, arguing that this article would subject the constitution to strong criticism on both the international and local levels: “Keeping this article would compromise the constitution of the revolution internationally and this is something we definitely don’t want at such a critical time. It would also infuriate revolutionary youths and several political factions and would give certain groups the opportunity to persuade people to vote no in the public referendum.”

In defense

Several members of the committee who voted in favor of the article defended their decision. Mohammad Abdel Aziz, co-founder of the signature collection campaign that triggered the ouster of Islamist President Mohammad Mursi, downplayed the danger posed by military trials since the conditions according to which they might take place were “very specific.” He also argued that the article, as it stands, is the best that could have been reached at a time when stability has not been yet achieved, especially as it managed to strike a balance between the aspirations of the revolution and the realities on the ground: “We responded to the revolutionaries’ objection to trying civilians before military courts and to the people’s demand that the state eliminates terrorism and which specifically targets the Armed Forces.” Abdel Aziz noted that this article was not drafted to stay forever in the constitution and can be changed as soon as normalcy is resorted: “When stability returns and a real democracy is established, two thirds of the parliament can amend this article.” Unlike most activists, member and spokesman of the committee Mohammad Salmawy sees the comparison between the new article and its counterpart in the 2012 constitution in favor of the former: “The 2012 constitution said that civilians involved in crimes that ‘harm the Armed Forces’ are to be tried before military courts while the new article specifies the cases and therefore is not as broad or vague.” Director Khaled Youssef, one of the members who voted yes and was accordingly slammed by his fellow filmmakers, did not defend the article, but rather described it as “the lesser of two evils.” Youssef explained that crossing out the article altogether, thus categorically banning the trial of civilians before military courts, was not an option in the first place: “It was either we leave it for the law to determine the cases that necessitate a military trial for civilians or we specify those cases from the start in the constitution so we chose the second option.” Youssef justifies this choice by noting that it would have been up to next parliament to pass a law that specifies offences against the military: “And since there is no way we can predict what kind of a parliament we’ll be getting next time, we preferred to do that now instead of crying over spilt milk later. I had hoped that constitution would be an ideal one that sees our dreams come true, but looks like it’s not time yet.” Youssef was kicked out of the protest organized by No to Military Trials.

Although this article was passed, the 50 members of the committee still have to vote on the entire constitution. This is to be done as soon as “the remaining controversial articles are agreed upon and a final version of the introduction is drafted,” said former Arab League chief and current chairman of the committee Amr Moussa. A no-vote is the hope before the last for detractors of this article and other articles seen as repressive and contrary to the demands of the revolution, the last hope being the public referendum.