Category: Analysis

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/11/14/Fate-of-Egyptian-NGOs-hangs-in-the-balance.html

Nov. 10 marked the expiry of the ultimatum given to Egyptian NGOs to “adjust their legal status” by registering under law 84, which dates back to ousted President Hosni Mubarak.

The registration decree was issued in July by Minister of Social Solidarity Ghada Wali, supported by amendments to the penal code, and approved by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

It states that citizens who receive material or logistical funding from local or foreign bodies for the purpose of destabilizing national security will be sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of no less than 500,000 Egyptian pounds ($69,924).

With the passing of the deadline, NGOs that have not registered risk facing criminal charges, while some opted to close down and others have started the registration process.

There is heated debate about whether the decree and amendment will enhance security or clamp down on civil society.

Several NGOs refused to register in principle, saying the law contradicted the nature of civil society.

Magda Adli, head of Al-Nadim Center for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, said: “The law allows the authorities to interfere in the NGO’s affairs, including sources of funding, which makes it no different from any governmental body.”

She added that NGOs are supposed to monitor the performance of government, not the other way round.

Mohamed Abdel Azim, head of the Hisham Mubarak Law Center, said registration under this law will give the government the right to approve only activities that serve its interests. “This will be a problem for our center, which basically works on torture.”

Saad al-Din Ibrahim, head of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Developmental Studies, said his organization will not register under the law. “If the government objects to our status, we’ll file a lawsuit and I’m sure we’ll win,” he said.

“I’ve actually been through many legal battles with the government, and the verdict is usually in our favor.”

Concerns over the law’s negative impact on civil society were expressed in a statement signed by 29 Egyptian NGOs: “The signatories of this statement believe that the law defeats the purpose of civil society since it aims at closing down independent organizations and authorizing only ones that will abide by the government’s rules.”

Hafez Abu Saeda, chairman of the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights, said the law violates article 75 the 2014 constitution on “the right to establish associations,” and “the right to form NGOs and institutions on a democratic basis, which shall acquire legal personality upon notification.”

That is why no action should be taken before a new law is issued in line with the constitution, Abu Saeda added.

“A law was already drafted by a civil society committee formed in 2013 under the former minister of social solidarity,” he said.

“Why not wait until this law is approved by the upcoming parliament, especially since it was approved by a large number of organizations?” The current law is also against international charters and democratic principles, since it deprives citizens of one of their basic political and civil rights, he added.

George Ishak, an activist and member of the National Council for Human Rights, said it is unlikely that any measures will be taken against NGOs that have not registered until the election of a new parliament.

The Ministry of Social Solidarity “is only negotiating with NGOs to adjust their status, but a new law will be issued by the upcoming parliament,” he said.

Legal expert Essam al-Islambouli said the amendment of the penal code does not target NGOs, but rather aims to fight terrorism. “The amendment aims to impose harsher penalties on those who receive funding in order to destabilize security.

I don’t know why NGOs are making a fuss about it,” he said, adding that some terrorist groups have used NGOs to store weapons.

A source at the Ministry of Interior, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said more than 80 NGOs in Egypt are operating outside the law.

“Some activists also work for foreign NGOs that have no offices in Egypt, and some of them attended conferences and training sessions without notifying the authorities,” he said, adding that Egypt is targeted by several countries that want to jeopardize its national security.

The National Security Bureau estimates the funds received by 57 NGOs in Egypt as of July 2014 at more than 100 million Egyptian pounds ($13,984,843).

Wali said nine foreign NGOs and eight Egyptian ones applied for registration before the deadline. “We are currently in the process of surveying NGOs that have not adjusted their status,” she said.

A source at the Ministry of Social Solidarity said a day after the deadline that looking into the files of unregistered NGOs will be postponed because “the ministry does not have a clear vision of the measures to be taken against those NGOs.”

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/11/08/Egypt-s-Sinai-evacuations-A-case-of-displacement-for-security-.html

Creating a buffer zone along the border with the Gaza Strip has been the Egyptian government’s priority since the Oct. 24 attack that killed more than 30 soldiers in the Sinai Peninsula. The plan, which promises to stem the flow of smuggled weapons and militants, necessitates the immediate evacuation of thousands of residents and the demolition of hundreds of homes.

While both the decision and the speed of its implementation are lauded as a positive step toward eliminating terrorism in a restive region, concerns about the financial and psychological damage sustained by locals are emerging.

Lawyer and human rights activist Gamal Eid said the evacuation constituted a blatant violation of the constitution. Article 63 “states clearly that forced evacuations of citizens are prohibited,” he said. “Even if only one person refuses to evacuate, it’s still a crime.” Eid also objected to permitting the evacuation in return for compensation. “The constitution mentioned nothing about compensation.”

Naeim Gabr, a chief of the Sawarka tribe in northern Sinai, said he did not see how evacuation would contribute to countering terrorism. “This is absolutely illogical. National security is achieved when an area is properly populated, not deserted,” he said, adding that some residents are planning to file lawsuits that could reach an international level. He also noted residents’ strong ties to their lands. “No compensation can replace the land for the locals of Sinai.”

Political activist Haitham Mohamedin said the evacuations “will neither end terrorism nor protect soldiers in Sinai. They’ll only trigger animosity between the people and the army,” which is “treating the people as second-class citizens, and accuses many of them of treason.” The army “is technically imposing martial laws on the people of Sinai, on the basis that the peninsula has become a military zone.”

However, security expert Hossam Sweilam said the evacuation plan “was done in agreement with the Sinai locals, and most of them accepted the decision and will be compensated. Even if it’s unconstitutional, the constitution isn’t a holy book, and national security takes precedence over the constitution.”

Sweilam said the buffer zone, and a planned canal inside it, will be large enough that members of Palestinian group Hamas “wouldn’t be able to infiltrate the Egyptian border.”

Military and strategic expert Mahmoud Zaher refuted claims that the government was treating Sinai residents as traitors. “On the contrary, the army is fully aware of the major role played by the people of Sinai in helping it combat terrorism,” he said. “The army is now asking them if they can go one more extra mile.”

Zaher also denied that Sinai residents were being treated as second-class citizens. “They are of course first-class citizens, and nobody can say otherwise. We know that evacuation isn’t a pleasant business, but the government is unfortunately forced to do it. It’s a matter of national security.”

Samir Ghattas, chairman of the Middle East Forum for Political Studies, highlighted the importance of a buffer zone in closing tunnels used to smuggle weapons and militants from Gaza into the border town of Rafah.

“Those tunnels constitute a grave threat to Egypt’s national security,” he said, adding that Hamas has been “using Sinai as a warehouse for their weapons” because “they’ll be safer than in [Gaza], where they’re subjected to Israeli attacks.” Ghattas said Sinai residents found to be involved in smuggling would be forcibly evacuated and not compensated.

He acknowledged that some residents have started complaining, but not about the evacuation in principle. “They only complained that they weren’t given enough time,” he said, referring to the 48 hours given to leave their homes.

Sinai-based journalist Mustafa Singer said the evacuation, “delivered over megaphones, took people by surprise.”

New York Times reporter Kareem Fahim said it was hard to gauge local reaction because it is difficult for journalists to get access to the area, and because protests without permission are strictly banned. “But the lack of outcry also seemed to measure the fatigue in Sinai, after decades of government neglect and months of armed conflict pitting the army against a stubborn insurgency.”

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/10/28/Egypt-s-new-societal-police-Better-security-or-more-repression-.html

On Oct. 18, the legislation committee at the Egyptian State Council approved the establishment of the “societal police.” According to the ruling, members of this force will be non-police civilians who will be given police powers, the power of arrest being the most significant. The new law lists shooting, martial arts, and dealing with riots among the skills members will be taught during their 18 months of training.

The societal police will be chosen according to certain criteria to be determined by the Interior Ministry, which this force will answer to. Since its inception, the law has been the subject of heated debate, with proponents considering it a step toward stability, and detractors foreseeing negative impacts on personal and political freedoms.

Fouad Allam, former deputy head of state security, considers the law a practical solution to the years-long security vacuum, and an efficient way to make citizens feel safer, especially in neighborhoods with a limited security presence.

“The presence of societal police, whose members will be regularly patrolling their respective areas, will lead to a remarkable drop in the crime rate, with criminals and terrorists finding it more difficult to melt into the crowds,” he said. Allam downplayed concerns about lack of training: “The new police will get the proper training so they’ll be able to handle all necessary situations while of course respecting citizens.”

Security expert Gamal Abu Zikri said establishing societal police “will offer a large number of job opportunities to Egyptian youths,” lauding the idea as “innovative.”

For journalist Ahmed Marei, societal police will complement regular police, especially when dealing with issues “that cannot be tackled with security measures only.” The law, he adds, will establish a close relationship between the people and security forces, with the latter including regular citizens. This will alleviate long-standing tensions between “society and state institutions.”

Societal police, Marei said, would “take the role of the citizen in the community to a much higher level,” and “raise security awareness among Egyptians in general.” Being part of the general public, they will also be better able to deal with post-crime situations in their areas: “They will, for example, offer support and advice for victims of domestic violence, and will play a major part in their rehabilitation and integration in society.”

Criticisms

The April 6 Youth Movement is vehemently opposed to the law. “The Interior Ministry is in charge of maintaining security and should assume full responsibility for that and solve the problems it has internally instead of resorting to external solutions,” said movement coordinator Amr Ali. The ministry needs to start a restructuring process that eliminates corruption and promotes citizenship principles, he added.

“Policemen need to know that their duty is to protect the people and to apply the law to everyone including their own people,” he said. In response to official statements about the existence of societal police in other countries, Ali said: “Each country has its own circumstances.”

Rights researcher Mina Thabet said establishing societal police is another step toward recruiting citizens for security apparatuses. “The Interior Ministry is making citizens work for it,” he said. “This started with encouraging students to write reports about their colleagues, then turning media outlets into propaganda machines, and now having detectives in every neighborhood and every street.”

The Justice Organization for Development and Human Rights said the ministry has ulterior motives beyond having citizens spy on each other. “The ministry is creating this new force to get away with the crimes it commits especially before international courts,” the organization said, adding that attributing violations to societal police is an ideal exit for regular police.

The Independent Judiciary Front, which considers the ouster of President Mohammed Mursi a military coup, called the new law a “legalization of thuggery,” in reference to the Interior Ministry’s recruitment of thugs to clamp down on activists during the era of President Hosni Mubarak.

“There has always been a shady, undeclared relationship between the ministry and thugs,” the front said. “This law will create legalized militias that crush opposition as instructed by the regime.”

Yousry Hammad, deputy head of the Watan Party, said societal police will be the Egyptian version of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, “which works for the regime and its cliques.”

For Mokhtar Ghubashi, head of the Arab Center for Political and Strategic Studies, giving societal police the right of arrest is alarming, especially since “the law doesn’t provide a detailed job description for the new police, or how they’re going to deal with crimes or political unrest.”

Legal expert Mohamed Abdel Fattah said regardless of the pros and cons of the law, a decision of that sort should have been postponed until a parliament is elected. “In fact, the State Council might retract the decision, or at least postpone its implementation, until there’s a parliament,” he said. The law is to be ratified by the president, who currently has legislative power until parliament is elected.

Ahmed Fawzi, secretary general of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, says the law not only ignores the necessity of parliamentary approval, but also overlooks civil society organizations. “This decision shouldn’t have been made without establishing societal dialogue.”

Based on available information, Hisham Mohammad Ahmed al-Tayeb is the first Egyptian to be stripped of his citizenship. According to a cabinet decree issued on Oct. 15, the decision was taken because of “his permanent residence outside the country and his links to a foreign body that works on destabilizing national security.”

Law 26 of 1975 gives the state the right to strip Egyptians of their citizenship “whether recently naturalized or of Egyptian parentage … at any time” if they are involved in “actions that threaten the country’s security.”

Journalist Ahmed al-Sawy questions why no information was released about Tayeb, either from the Interior Ministry that requested the penalty or the cabinet that authorized it.

“The published decree contained no details,” wrote Sawy. “What is the crime Tayeb committed to deserve having his nationality stripped? What is the name of the foreign body that works on destabilizing Egypt’s security?”

Sawy said even if this body is Mossad, there has not been one case when such action was taken against people found guilty of spying for Israel, and the same applies to terrorists.

“None of the terrorists convicted before civil or military courts were stripped of their nationality even with their threat reaching its peak in the 80s and 90s,” he wrote.

Sawy cited the examples of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mustafa Hamza, the mastermind of the plot to assassinate former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia.

Despite the limited information available about Tayeb and his alleged crime, the decision has stirred controversy, with many wondering if this punishment will be applied to more Egyptians.

Gamal Eid, head of the Arab Network for Human Rights Information, said such a decision cannot be made without a court order. “If a person is acting suspiciously, then a trial should take place,” he said. “But it’s totally unacceptable to strip people of their nationality without giving clear reasons.”

Mohammad Zarea, head of the Arab Penal Reform Organization, agreed that a trial should precede such a decision, which in the case of Tayeb is administrative, not judicial.

Zarea added that stripping people of their citizenship “violates all universal charters” and is “a practice no longer applied anywhere around the world.”

He said this punishment can only be applied automatically if Egyptians obtain a foreign passport without permission from the Interior Ministry, as required by law. “However, there are many Egyptians who did this and were never stripped of their citizenship.”

Gamal Gibril, professor of constitutional law, said the judiciary is not authorized to strip citizenship. “However, the citizen whose nationality was stripped can file a lawsuit against the prime minister to contest the decision,” he said, adding that the state should announce the reasons for such a decision in order not to stir the public.

Ahmed Arafat, head of the Constitutional Reformation Committee at the City Council, said: “A new constitutional declaration has to be issued by the president” to make such a punishment constitutional.

There have been previous calls to strip members of terrorist groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, of their citizenship.
“Those who conspire against their countries do not deserve to carry its passport,” said former MP Mohammad Abu Hamed. “If the constitution allows sentencing terrorists to death then surely stripping them of their nationality would not be a problem.”

Abdel Ghaffar Shokr, head of the Socialist Alliance Party and vice chairman of the National Council for Human Rights, said Brotherhood members can be stripped of their citizenship as a last resort if they continue to threaten Egypt’s security.

“The Netherlands has actually announced stripping members of terrorist and militant groups of Dutch nationality and this is a good step on the road to eliminating terrorism,” he said.

The Brotherhood denies having any connection with Tayeb, as claimed by some media outlets.

“Only fascist regimes would strip citizens of their nationality,” said Mohammad Gamal Heshmat, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood Council. “Yet we would expect anything from a regime that came to power through a coup and for this reason every decision it makes is null and void.”

Activist Karim Abdel Radi objected in principle to giving the state the right to strip people of their citizenship.

“The state does not have the right to strip citizens of their nationality because it did not bestow it upon them in the first place,” he said.

“If the state is allowed to make such decisions, then every citizen who belongs to the opposition would risk the same fate.”

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/10/15/Religious-parties-in-Egypt-threatened-with-political-ban.html

The Court of Urgent Matters is expected to issue  a verdict this week in the lawsuit that demands the disbanding of all political parties with a religious platform.

The lawsuit was filed by Tarek Mahmoud, legal advisor of the Popular Front against the Brotherhoodization of Egypt, established in 2012 after the Muslim Brotherhood came to power.

Mahmoud based his lawsuit on Article 74 of the 2013 constitution, drafted after the toppling of Brotherhood rule, which says “all citizens have the right to establish political parties as regulated by the law provided that those parties are not formed on the basis of religion, gender or ethnic discrimination, sectarianism, or geographical location.”

The article also says political parties can only be dissolved through a court order.

Mahmoud demands that the Supreme Elections Committee, which will supervise the upcoming parliamentary elections, be instructed to reject the nomination papers of the 11 parties targeted by the lawsuit.

Mahmoud won an earlier lawsuit that banned Brotherhood members from taking part in parliamentary elections on the basis of its designation as a terrorist group.

He later accused other religious parties of pledging allegiance to the Brotherhood. “Most leaders of those parties fled, or are detained for collaborating with the Muslim Brotherhood and inciting violence against the state,” he said.

According to the complaint filed with the Court of Urgent Matters, religious parties “have been using politics as a façade for engaging in religious practices in violation of the Egyptian constitution.”

If those parties take part in parliamentary elections and win, the complaint said, Egypt will face “a serious threat” since they will exploit religion to achieve their goals and issue legislation that serves their agendas.

The complaint says the threat is intensified by the fact that many of those parties still consider the June 30 protests that toppled Brotherhood rule a military coup, and so do not recognize the current government.

Mahmoud said due to the unconstitutionality of religious parties, the parliament in which they win seats would be similarly unconstitutional. “The parliament itself would, therefore, be prone to dissolution.”

Judge Mohamed Hamed al-Gamal, former chairman of the State Council, said religious parties should face the same fate as the Brotherhood since they have the same ideological reference.

“Those parties don’t acknowledge borders and aren’t loyal to the nation, but rather to what they claim is the Islamic caliphate,” he said.

Gamal added that there is no need for another court order to disband religious parties since there is already a precedent in the case of the Brotherhood.

“The state, as represented by the president and the cabinet, should make a decision to apply the previous verdict on all similar parties,” he said.

Minister of Islamic Endowments Mohamed Mokhtar Gomaa said each party in question “uses religion to impose its ideologies – which are usually fanatical – on society, and they go to extremes as they at times accuse others of apostasy and even sanction their bloodshed.”

Gomaa said those organizations use community work as a pretext to take advantage of the religious tendencies of Egyptians in order to gain power.

“That’s why the presence of these parties constitutes a grave threat to the fabric of Egyptian society and jeopardizes its unity,” he said.

Shawki al-Sayed, professor of constitutional law, said the history of Islamist groups has long demonstrated the dangers of mixing religion and politics.

“This goes back to 1948, when then-Interior Minister Abdel Rahman Omar exposed the crimes of the Brotherhood and highlighted the damage inflicted on the political scene as a result of the use of religion in politics,” he said.

Religious basis or reference?

Emad al-Mahdy, former member of the upper house of parliament for the Nour Party, which is included in the lawsuit, distinguishes between a religious party and one that makes religion its reference.

He argues that a religious party “would make religion an integral part of its platform and would, therefore, discriminate on the basis of religion.” This, he adds, is against the constitution and the principles of citizenship.

Making Islamic law the party’s reference, however, is different, he said. “Article 2 of the constitution states that Islamic law is the main source of legislation, therefore making this law a reference for the party is not unconstitutional.”

Only examining the political platform of each party will determine if it is a religious party or one with a religious reference, he added. “This platform can be changed if it proves to have a religious basis.”

“The Nour Party has since its inception been keen on not using religion in politics, and on demonstrating that it only takes Islamic law as its main reference,” Mahdy said.

Emad Gad, analyst at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, refutes the arguments of the Nour Party.

“It was obvious in the performance of party members who won seats in the previous parliament that the party represents the organization and its discourse was always religious,” he wrote.

Gad said the Nour Party’s eventual support for the June 30 protests was not representative of its members’ convictions.

“The dispersal of the sit-ins resulted in the death and detention of more members from Nour than from the Brotherhood,” he said.

“While at the grassroots level, members of the party joined the ranks of the Brotherhood because they shared the same ideologies, the leadership made a political calculation and decided to support the protests that ousted the Brotherhood.”

The Nour Party’s participation in the toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood and its subsequent support for current President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in the elections is seen as contradictory to the constitutional ban on religious parties and which is expected to affect Nour more than any other party. That is why the alliance between Sisi and Nour, which Washington Post correspondent Erin Cunningham calls “tenuous,” seems to have fulfilled its purpose and is not expected to last for long.

According to Cunningham, the alliance between Sisi and Nour was mainly based on “a shared interest in eradicating the Brotherhood as a political force.” The power-sharing process that has followed is expected to be rife with challenges especially that Sisi is not likely to apply the strict version of Islam that Nour demands. For example, “Nour party has in the past proposed banning alcohol and revealing swimsuits on beaches, moves that would thwart government plans to revive Egypt’s tourism industry and promote economic recovery,” wrote Cunningham.

In fact, when asked in a TV interview how the backing of Nour Party would affect his future dealings with the party, Sisi’s reply was quite straightforward. “Don’t forget that the new constitution, the drafting of which Nour Party attended, bans any religious parties,” he said, adding that he doesn’t owe anybody anything.

However, political analyst Wahid Abdel Meguid said the article that bans the establishment of political parties on religious bases is not enough to evaluate the legitimacy of the parties in question.

“We have to admit that the term ‘religious basis’ is a vague one,” he said. “There has to be a law that defines the activities that would categorize a party as religious.”

Abdel Meguid does not see disbanding parties as a solution. “The new law should ban the use of religious slogans and mosques in electoral campaigns,” he said.

He added that the ban should not be confined to religious parties, since the National Democratic Party, which ruled Egypt prior to the Jan. 25 revolution, also used religious discourse for propaganda.

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/09/20/Egyptian-homosexuals-and-the-crime-of-debauchery-.html

The recent arrests of seven men, after appearing in a video of a wedding party of two males, has reignited debate about whether homosexuality is a crime, and if “debauchery” is the right label for it.

The case has brought back to the fore Egypt’s most publicized clampdown on homosexuals, when 52 men were arrested at a bar on May 11, 2011. Of those, 25 were sentenced to up to five years in prison for “debauchery” and “defaming Islam.”

This led to activists marking May 11 as the Egyptian Day Against Homophobia (EDAHO). “Legally, homosexuality isn’t a crime that people should be charged for in Egypt,” said EDAHO in a statement. Nonetheless, there are “different forms of homophobic violations.”

Reuters journalist Lin Noueihed wrote: “Though homosexuality is not specifically outlawed in Egypt, discrimination is rife. The accused are typically charged with debauchery, immorality or blasphemy.”

NBC Cairo correspondent Duncan Golestani concurs: “Egypt has no specific laws banning homosexuality, although there are plenty of ways to charge someone suspected of engaging in homosexual acts. Police will often charge gay people with ‘debauchery’ or breaking the country’s law of public morals.”

A poll conducted by the Pew Research Center highlighted that “in Egypt’s conservative, predominantly Muslim society, homophobia is embedded, with 95% of Egyptians sharing the conviction that ‘homosexuality should not be accepted’.”

State involvement in igniting homophobic sentiment was highlighted by journalist Shahira Amin in a report published days after the wedding video was filmed. “Some analysts said at the time that the sudden crackdown was a means of diverting attention away from the regime’s failures, including a political crisis and a looming economic recession,” wrote Amin.

“Critics of the 2011 crackdown also believed it was an attempt by the then-autocratic regime to present an image as ‘the guardian of public virtue so as to deflate an Islamist opposition movement that appeared to be gaining support every day’.”

Dashed hopes

Amin quoted Egyptian homosexual Karim, who said his community’s hopes for more tolerance and freedom following the Jan. 25, 2011 revolution were dashed. “We had a lot of hope then, but the last three years have only brought disappointment,” Karim said. “There has been no change in people’s attitudes. In fact, we get insulted more often now, as people feel emboldened knowing that the authorities are siding with them.”

Homosexuals, Karim added, were more concerned following the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is why they took part in the June 30, 2013 protests that toppled Islamist President Mohamed Mursi. “We were overjoyed when he was toppled, and hoped there would be fewer restrictions on us from then on.”

However, according to a report by U.S.-based Human Rights First: “Since the 2013 ouster of the Morsi regime, arrests of members of the LGBT [lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender] community have increased along with the escalated crackdown on political dissenters, activists and journalists.”

The current Egyptian authorities are trying to prove to the people that they are not less conservative than the Brotherhood, and that they will continue to safeguard Islamic values, HRF added.

This view is supported by Adam Dott, a homosexual Egyptian graphic designer: “We know that we’re an easy target for the government, because if they decide to crack down on us we’ll get little support from the community, and the government may even gain more popularity because they’ll be seen as protectors of morals.”

Adel Ramadan, legal officer at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, said: “After the fall of [Hosni] Mubarak, the criticism of revolutionary groups has always contained a sexual element. Women who participate in protests are often called prostitutes or ‘loose’ women, while male revolutionary activists are called homosexuals.”

This was made easier, Golestani said, because homosexuals became more visible due to their role in the revolution: “The natural instinct for most gay Egyptians is to try not to draw attention to themselves, but taking part in the revolution has brought greater visibility – at a cost.”

While activists and rights groups accuse the current government of intensifying the crackdown on homosexuals, Islamists and Brotherhood supporters attribute the appearance of the gay marriage video, and what they see as an increase in the number of homosexuals, to the moral decadence of the state following Mursi’s ouster.

Pro-Brotherhood activist Amr Abdel Hadi blamed the 2014 post-Mursi constitution for the spread of homosexuality. “It is normal now to see men marrying each other after the drafting of the coup’s constitution by people known for immorality and lack of principles,” he wrote.

Abdel Hadi accused the government of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of making Western values its reference, and of making the official religious institution serve its interests. Salafist leader Moatasem Shendi said gay marriages were due to an increasing tendency to disregard religious values. “Now we don’t need more evidence that we are facing a war on Islam,” he wrote.

Sheikh Abdel Hamid al-Atrash, head of the Religious Edicts (Fatwa) Committee at Al-Azhar, called for the expulsion of all homosexuals from Egypt “so that vice would not be allowed to spread in our society.”

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/09/08/New-Suez-Canal-alarming-challenges-and-awaited-benefits-.html

On Sept. 4, investment certificates aimed at funding the Suez Canal development project were available for purchase at Egypt’s four public banks. By the end of the day, the total amount paid had reached 6 billion Egyptian pounds ($839 million), according to Hesham Ramez, governor of the central bank.

He attributed the demand to “the patriotism of Egyptians who are keen on contributing to such an enormous national project,” as well as the relatively high interest provided by the certificates. “Almost 90% of the buyers are individuals and not corporations,” he said. The turnout led to banks extending their working hours.

However, Investment Minister Ashraf Salman said prior to the issuing of the certificates that he expected the money raised to cover the total cost of digging the new canal, which is 60 billion Egyptian pounds.

The Guardian newspaper ran an article about thousands of Egyptians being evicted without compensation to make way for the new canal. Patrick Kingsley and Manu Abdo reported that in the villages of Qantara and Abtal, 1,500 homes were destroyed and another 5,000 are threatened.

“Soldiers told evicted villagers they had no right to live on the land as it technically had always belonged to the army,” they wrote. “Some of those who argued back were arrested.”

Implementation

The project is seen by some as a national achievement, and by others as an uncalculated adventure. A major implementation challenge has already emerged with the appearance of underground water during the drilling process. This is expected to greatly increase costs, especially in light of the one-year deadline set by the president, which the army has promised to stick to.

“The cost of drilling underwater will exceed 10 times the cost of drilling in dry lands,” said engineering professor Haitham Awad. The proximity of the drilling site to the original canal played a major role in creating the problem, he added. “The drilling site chosen was 400 meters from the Suez Canal, but it would have been better to choose a site between 8 and 10 kilometers from the old canal.”

Iman Fathi, an expert at the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources, said the appearance of underground water was due to the absence of necessary research that should precede implementation. “There were not enough studies conducted on the characteristics of the soil in the construction sites,” she said. This will not only drastically increase costs, but also make timely completion impossible, she added.

However, several state-run and independent media outlets celebrated the appearance of water as a sign of progress, while official statements presented the use of dredges as a triumph.

“The introduction of dredges to the construction site marks the start of a new stage in the project,” said Mohab Mamish, chairman of the Suez Canal Authority. “The fact that this stage started only 24 days after the beginning of the project is an achievement in itself.”

Revenue

Economic concerns relating to technical challenges have been voiced by experts. Economist Omar al-Sheneti said he was skeptical about the amount of revenue that the project is expected to generate, and questioned the official argument that digging a new canal would increase the number of vessels passing through it.

“Doubling the number of vessels passing through the Suez Canal is primarily linked to the global trade movement, which increases by 2-3% in regular periods, excluding periods of recession,” he said. “This raises concerns about the achievement of the desired figures and revenues.” Funding the project through investment certificates is also problematic, especially with the high interest they offer, he added.

“The financial return on investment certificates will be funded from the profits of the Suez Canal, until the new canal achieves financial surpluses,” Sheneti said. “Consequently, there is a problem with economic feasibility that will affect the net income of the Suez Canal allocated to cover the deficit and finance part of the state’s general budget.”

Hani Tawfik, investment expert and head of the Arab Investment Union, expressed apprehension that the project would face the same fate as the Toshka, or New Valley, project in Egypt’s Western Desert, which started off ambitiously but ground to a halt.

“There is a lack of feasibility studies, and engineering figures and investment management remain a mystery, even though nobody doubts the seriousness and enthusiasm of the current regime to implement the project,” he said.

Tawfik also objected to foreigners not being allowed to purchase investment certificates. “This decision was first taken when contributors were to become shareholders, but now since contribution is through the purchase of investment certificates, there is nothing wrong with it,” he said.

Economic expert Ahmed al-Sayed al-Naggar said the project would offer a solution to Egypt’s pressing unemployment problem, through job opportunities both during the digging process and after completion.

He said he expects an economic boom. “Some 18,000 ships sail through the canal every year, a figure that could double after the new project increases the number of giant cargo vessels passing through, raises revenues and the canal’s share of world trade.”

Naggar supports the state’s decision to restrict the purchase of investment certificates to Egyptians, saying the original canal was dug by foreign funds that left Egypt with huge debt and led to the British occupation.

“Therefore, it is important from the start to ensure that funding for constructing the canal is 100% Egyptian, while Arab and foreign capital would later finance industrial and service projects,” he wrote. “The old canal and the new project must remain entirely Egyptian.”

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On Aug. 20, Egyptian Prime Minister Ibrahim Mahlab said power cuts would decrease from the following week as the government increases supply to the national electricity network.

At the same press conference, Electricity Minister Mohamed Shaker and Petroleum Minister Ashraf Ismail explained how the crisis would be tackled.

“Around 4.8 megawatts of electricity will be added to the national grid, and this is expected to narrow the widening gap between production and consumption,” said Shaker.

Ismail said: “The supply of natural gas to electricity stations has already increased by 100 million cubic feet at the beginning of August, while an additional 60 [million] will be supplied in the coming few days.

There will also be another 220 million in September and 235 [million] in October.” Mahlab said: “We admit that there is a serious and complicated problem, but we are dealing with it.”

The blackouts, which have been occurring across the country as frequently as six times a day in some areas, have not only been a source of misery for Egyptians – particularly during the summer heat – but also a mystery, with the public pondering the causes.

Ahmed Heikal, an energy expert and chairman of Citadel Capital, said Egypt is suffering from “a triple attack.” First, there is an acute shortage of natural gas, which is used to run power stations.

“This shortage is partly the result of the Egyptian government’s failure to pay its dues to international oil companies operating in the country, and which would’ve otherwise developed new natural gas fields,” he said. “As a result, Egypt’s production of natural gas has been dropping drastically.”

Heikal also blamed the subsidy system, from which big industries benefited through paying much less for electricity than it cost the state.

“The state pays 0.75 Egyptian pounds per electricity unit, then sells it for 0.3. That is why I commend President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi for reducing fuel subsidies.”

The third factor contributing, Heikel said, is the negligence of power stations across the country: “Existing power stations haven’t been properly maintained for years, and new ones haven’t been built to face the increasing demand.”

Heikal mainly blamed ousted President Hosni Mubarak for the accumulated shortcomings that led to the current electricity crisis, while saying the lowest rate of natural gas production took place under President Mohamed Mursi.

Kareem Fahim and Merna Thomas wrote in the New York Times that the crisis was not a surprise.

“Experts have been warning of a looming energy disaster for more than a decade, saying there was little long-term planning to accommodate the country’s galloping growth,” they wrote.

“In the last few years, as shortages of natural gas and government funds became desperate and as the aging power infrastructure failed, policy mistakes and postponed decisions made everything worse.”

Sabotage

Mistakes of previous regimes are, however, not seen as the only cause for the unprecedented power cuts. Electricity Ministry spokesman Mohamed al-Yamani said saboteurs were also responsible.

Security expert Mahmoud Qatari said the Muslim Brotherhood’s main objective was to control the state’s vital institutions, which they tried to do by appointing as many of its members as possible in those institutions.

“They succeeded in making this happen in several ministries,” including that of electricity, he said. “Now that the Muslim Brotherhood is ousted, its members remain in their positions, and from there work on their scheme to topple the Egyptian state.”

Security expert Osama al-Tawil said there were “sleeper cells” in ministries that control main services such as electricity. “Those people are very dangerous because they have access to maps of Egypt’s electricity networks,” he said, calling on the security apparatus to identify and dismiss them.

Mahlab said power stations across Egypt were subjected to 300 sabotage attempts in July alone. “For this reason, new legislation will be issued to determine the penalty for such crimes,” he said. A few days later, the cabinet approved a modification of the penal code that includes sabotaging electricity towers and networks.

In the same vein, the Interior Ministry announced the identification of six cells that specialize in sabotaging electricity stations. “Those cells include 40 members of the Muslim Brotherhood,” the ministry said.

According to ministry spokesman Hani Abdel Latif, “leaders of the international [Brotherhood] organization scolded senior members of the group in Egypt for no longer being able to mobilize the people, and devised an alternative scheme that revolves around targeting the country’s vital facilities like power stations.”

Meanwhile, the Egyptian independent daily Al-Watan ran a major story that 160 Brotherhood members work at the Electricity Ministry, many in senior positions.

Excuses?

However, in her article “Amateur ministers and fuel shortage cause power cuts,” Noha al-Nahhas dismisses the link between the blackouts and the Brotherhood.

She wrote that power cuts were among the reasons for the uprising against Mursi, who hails from the Brotherhood.

“Egyptians assumed that Mursi’s departure will be accompanied by a lifting of the darkness that had been shrouding the whole country since it was believed that he exported electricity to Gaza,” she wrote. “Now it’s been more than a year since Mursi left and the darkness remains and Egyptians are left wondering why the blackouts are becoming more frequent.”

Nahhas quoted oil expert Ramadan Abul Ela, who said: “The ministers of electricity and petroleum are a failure and have no clear strategy to deal with the crisis.

They are just amateurs.” Abul Ela downplayed the damage incurred by sabotage: “Even if electricity stations are targeted, this would never result in power cuts throughout the entire country.”

Revolutionary movements have also expressed indignation at what they consider excuses from the government to shift blame.

“Electricity officials know nothing about electricity and do nothing except issue ludicrous statements,” said the April 6 Youth Movement. Mohamed Salah, a member of the movement’s politburo, slammed the subsidy cuts that the government applied abruptly.

“Instead of coming up with a fair plan that applies those cuts to the rich only, the government made a decision that would increase the suffering of the poor,” he said.

“The government has utterly failed in dealing with the electricity problem and officials only sit in their air-conditioned offices while the people remain in this darkness.”

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“The ouster of Hosni Mubarak was not a revolution, but a ‘conspiracy’ that “took advantage of some people’s discontent in order to add fuel to the fire,” said his lawyer Farid al-Deeb at the August 2 hearing of the former Egyptian president’s trial.

The objective “was not reform as the case appeared to be, but rather chaos,” said Deeb.

He quoted several officials to back his case, including the then-chief of military police, the current head of national security, and former Interior Minister Ahmed Gamal al-Deen.

Deeb’s statement has caused widespread controversy. Columnist Mohamed Rushdi wrote: “The Egyptian constitution stresses that [Jan. 25] was a noble and great revolution… Who is right then, Deeb or the constitution?”

Rushdi said if Deeb was right, it would necessitate modifying the constitution and putting the army and religious institutions on trial “on charges of taking part in a conspiracy to undermine the Egyptian state.”

Rushdi added: “On June 27, 2011, and in his defense statement in the same case, Deeb actually said the Jan. 25 revolution was an honorable one that was endorsed by Mubarak, who fully acknowledged the people’s legitimate demands and did not attempt to stop their peaceful protests.”

Rushdi expressed surprise that while an Egyptian belly dancer was summoned to the General Prosecutor’s office for wearing “an indecent dance outfit” modeled after the Egyptian flag, Deeb is getting away with a much greater crime.

“Article 98 B of the Penal Code states that whoever attempts to undermine the basic principles of the constitution is to be punished by jail or fine or both. So shouldn’t some action be taken to protect our constitution from the whims of opportunists?” asked Rushdi.

Gamal Eid, director of the Arab Network for Human Rights Information, said Deeb “insulted the Egyptian constitution, which honors the revolution, and this is a crime.”

Mustafa Kamel al-Sayed, professor of political science, blamed the judge for not taking action against the lawyer.

“Shouldn’t the judge have stopped Deeb’s defense statement on the basis that it violated the constitution?” Sayed asked.

Israa Abdel Fattah, an activist and co-founder of the April 6 Youth Movement, said Deeb not only violated the constitution, but also the “power hand-over document” given by former interim President Adly Mansour to current President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi upon the latter’s electoral victory.

Former MP Gamal Zahran said Deeb “insulted the Egyptian people by portraying them as a ‘herd’ that responds to any external plots dictated to it. He tarnished the image of Egyptians and derided their willpower.”

The Guardians of the Revolution Party accused Deeb of “belittling the sacrifice of Egyptian youths who lost their lives in defense of the revolution.”

In addition to calls to put Deeb on trial, there are demands to revoke his membership in the Lawyers’ Syndicate.

The head of the syndicate, Sameh Ashour, received a letter signed by hundreds of lawyers accusing Deeb of tarnishing the image of the law by “turning it from a profession for the defense of the innocent to one for the defense of tyrants.”

The letter, which called for the syndicate’s General Assembly to hold an urgent meeting to discuss the matter, underlined Deeb’s “shameful history,” referring to his defense of Israeli spy Azzam Azzam.

This point was also raised by writer Tarek Abbas, who said Deeb has always been known for defending cases considered by the public to be high treason.

In Azzam’s case, “the Israeli embassy in Cairo asked for Deeb by name,” Abbas wrote.

Journalist Mohamed Amin wrote an article in which he said calling the Jan. 25 revolution a conspiracy is one of Deeb’s strategies to get Mubarak acquitted.

“Deeb does not want Mubarak to be pardoned. He wants him acquitted. He wants him to eventually get a massive funeral like the one [former President Gamal Abdel] Nasser got,” Amin wrote.

That is why Deeb used testimonies from Mubarak’s men, the journalist added.

“None of those whose testimonies are included in the defense statement were expected to denounce the man who was the reason for all the power they had gotten,” he wrote.

Deeb took advantage of the fact that Egyptian public opinion is not as fiercely against Mubarak’s acquittal as it had been before, Amin added.

“He knows that people are not keen on seeking revenge against an ailing man in his mid-80s, and he tries to garner as much sympathy for him as possible,” the journalist wrote.

Amin’s article, published in the independent Egyptian daily Al-Masry al-Youm, led Deeb to file a lawsuit against him, accusing the journalist of trying to influence the court by questioning the validity of witnesses’ testimony.

Deeb responded to his critics: “Those who criticize my defense arguments are ignorant and have ulterior motives. They know nothing about the basics of legal arguments. I ask everyone who wants to sue me to please go ahead.”

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A few days after the start of the Israeli offensive in Gaza, former ambassador and deputy foreign minister Ibrahim Yousri announced his intention to sue the Egyptian government over its closure of the Rafah Crossing between the beleaguered strip and Egypt.

Yousri, who filed a similar lawsuit against ousted President Hosni Mubarak for the same reason, called the closing of the crossing “a crime against humanity” and cited an earlier report issued by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs under the title “The Humanitarian impact of reduced access between Gaza and Egypt” and which traced the repercussions of the closure since September 2013, that is two months after the toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood rule.

“The Egyptian government is taking part in the blockade on Gaza and is actually implementing till this moment a decision taken by late Prime Minister Ariel Sharon,” he said in the press interview. Yousri demanded that the crossing be opened on permanent basis and argued that partial opening is not enough in the light of the daily casualties of the Israeli aggression. “Gaza is being heavily bombed and opening the crossing for limited times does not help with the urgent need for medical supplies and the increasing number of the injured,” he explained.

Yousri, who previously led a campaign against the export of Egyptian natural gas to Israel, insisted that the Egyptian authorities have no good reason for keep the crossing closed. “What is the point of closing the crossing as long as no security threat in involved?” asked Yousri, thus underlining the crux of the entire controversy over the opening/closure of Gaza’s only gate to the outside world and which basically revolves around the conflict between urgency of opening the border for humanitarian reasons and the apprehension of doing so for security concerns.

Egyptian political community on Gaza

A group of Egyptian parties and revolutionary movements issued a joint statement calling upon President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to order the permanent and unconditional opening the Rafah crossing. “The crossing should remain open at all times regardless of whether there is an Israeli aggression or not,” said the statement. “It is a matter of survival for the Palestinian people and should not be subject to negotiation.” The statement added that Egypt’s position on Palestine should not be associated with factional infighting.

“The relationship between Egypt and Palestine must rise above any disagreements with one faction or another for the people of both countries have fought the same battles and the Palestinian cause will remain the Arabs’ major concern.” Signatories to the statement, which included leftist, liberal, and Islamist parties, argued that the closure of the crossing implies an endorsement on the part of the current Egyptian regime of the aggression on Gaza. “Closing the only exit for the people of Gaza and imposing restrictions on aid passing through it means that the regime is supporting this aggression.” The statement also saw no contradiction between opening the crossing and “taking all the necessary measures to maintain Egypt’s national security.”

Palestinian reaction to closure of Rafah

Ayad al-Bazam, spokesman for the Palestinian Interior Ministry, criticized the Egyptian government over the abrupt closure of the Rafah Crossing on July 11 after announcing its partial opening on July 10. “The crossing was closed once again in the face of the injured without any reasons after ambulances and buses were all ready to cross after the opening was announced,” he wrote. “We regret this step on the part of the Egyptian authorities and which demonstrates indifference towards the suffering of the injured.” Bazam added that hundreds of Gazans were wounded and needed urgent medical care as medical supplies in the strip are running out.

In his article “Egypt’s hard line over border,” Lee Keath argued that by insisting on not opening the border, the Egyptian government could at some point be partially held accountable for the increase of the casualties of the Israeli aggression. “As civilian casualties rise in Gaza, Egypt’s government runs the risk that Egyptians will blame it for not making concessions that could stop the bloodshed,” he wrote. It is for this reason, Lee argues, that Egyptian media has been engaged in constant demonization of Hamas. “The vilification of Hamas in Egypt has only increased since the Gaza war erupted,” Lee explained. “Egyptian TV stations and newspapers—which are overwhelmingly pro-government—have issued a stream of commentary that sounds a lot like what is coming from Israel: Hamas is to blame for the fighting and is exploiting civilian deaths for its own gain.”

Egypt’s explanation for closure

For Egyptian authorities, the Rafah Crossing “is a red line,” as Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukri put it. Shoukri explained that Egyptian policy as far as the crossing is concerned is related to the security situation in the Sinai Peninsula. “We are not in any way party to the blockade on Gaza and we will do our best to help the Palestinian people,” he said. Shoukri added that it is thanks to Egypt that a ground war was not launched in Gaza and that the international community is praising Egypt’s ceasefire initiative. “However, if the initiative fails, those who reject it will be held accountable for the current situation,” he added in reference to Hamas.

He also said that Egypt rejects any suggestion of international supervision on the crossing, also in reference to a proposal by Hamas. Several Egyptian analysts see Hamas’s insistence on the opening of the crossing while knowing that Egypt would not grant this demand as a strategy to keep the conflict going in a way that serves its interests.

“Hamas does not want to solve the problem, but rather to achieve political victory at the expense of Palestinian blood,” said military expert and former governor of North Sinai Ali Hefzi. “If Egypt opens the crossing Hamas will resume using smuggling tunnels, which made them extremely rich. They even established an authority for the management of tunnels and imposed taxes on the use of these tunnels.” Hefzi criticized Hamas for demanding that the crossing be placed under international supervision, another request the movement knows beforehand would not be granted. “Hamas knows that Egypt will never accept that,” he said. “Would Hamas dare to request the same from Israel?” According to Hefzi, Hamas aims at embarrassing both Egypt and the Palestinian Authority.

According to Peter Beaumont, the main reason for Egypt’s unwillingness to open the Rafah crossing is the fact that this is a major Hamas demand in the ceasefire negotiations or because “Egypt does not want to gift Hamas something that would increase its popularity—which had been on the wane in part as a result of the hardship resulting from the Egyptian border closure,” as he put it. Beaumont quotes Hamas official Hamad Nahal, who complained that since July 2013, the crossing would remain closed for up to 40 consecutive days: “It is our lifeline. It is why it is so important in the ceasefire talks.”

In the same article, published in The Guardian, Beaumont quotes Palestinian analyst Omar Shaban, who does not agree that the Rafah Crossing is the main plight of Palestinians in Gaza, especially when compared to other pressing problems like water shortage, unemployment, and poverty, and argues that Hamas wants it open mainly to further its own agenda. “Hamas focuses on itself, which is why Rafah is important to it,” he said. “Of course, they want Rafah to open to ease the lives of people here and to show it was them that got it [open].” Gaza-based political scientist Mkhaimar Abu Sadr, also quoted by Beaumont, begs to differ as he views the opening of the crossing as vital. “In the end the only thing that can really end the bloodshed is a lifting of the siege,” he said.

For Beaumont, Hamas’s escalation of attacks on Israel could be seen as the group’s strategy to provoke a ground incursion that would earn it a stronger position in the talks, in which all demands “are negotiable, but not Rafah.” Egyptian authorities, on the other hand, are not yielding to pressure from Hamas in any way. “Egypt has clamped down on smuggling tunnels that for several years made the town of Rafah and Hamas rich,” Beaumont explained. “It does not want the crossing controlled by Hamas, but by Mahmoud Abbas’s Palestinian Authority.”

In his article “The tragedy of Rafah Crossing,” Motasem A. Dalloul also conceded that the current standoff over the crossing is linked to the current tension between Hamas and the Egyptian regime, particularly president elect Sisi. “The new Egyptian president Sisi, who closed the Rafah crossing after carrying out a military coup last July against the first freely elected president, Mohamed Morsi, has problems with Hamas, which has ruled Gaza for years, because of the Islamic resistance movement’s close relations with his enemy—the Muslim Brotherhood,” he wrote.