Coptic Easter: How Egypt celebrates the rising of Christ

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Coptic Easter, which falls on the Sunday following the full moon that comes after the vernal equinox (March 21), is one of the two most important holy days for Egyptian Christians, the other being Coptic Christmas on Jan. 7. Coptic Easter marks the end of the 55-day Lent, commonly known as the Great Fast, where all animal products – including milk, cheese and butter – are prohibited.

While Coptic fasting time is unequalled in any other Christian community, with a total of 210 days in 365, the pre-Easter fast is the longest. That is why the feasting that follows it is the most remarkable in Egyptian Coptic culture.

On Easter eve or Holy Saturday, which falls this year on April 11, Coptic Christians start their Easter Vigil, also known as The Great Vigil, which lasts until the dawn of Easter. It is preferable for those who can to fast completely – that is, abstain from food and drink – on Good Friday and Holy Saturday, and break the fast upon the end of Mass.

The Easter Eve ceremony includes a symbolic reenactment of Christ’s ascension, also called the “resurrection play.” The play shows the gates of heaven closed following Adam’s sin and his expulsion from the Garden of Eden. Lights are turned off to symbolize the darkness humanity lived in before the advent of Christ. The light that follows indicates that Christ has risen and was able to open the gates of heaven, thus cleansing humanity from the original sin.

The prayers are recited in Coptic and Arabic. All Egyptian Christians, including those not familiar with the Coptic language, know by heart the sentence repeated on that night: “Ekhrestos Anesti, Alisos Anesti” (Christ is risen! Truly He is risen).

Easter day is known for the banquets that Coptic families prepare to break their long fast. The food served is not very different from that commonly consumed during the two main Islamic holidays. Like the Lesser Bairam, cookies and biscuits are purchased or home-baked, and like the Greater Bairam, meat and Egyptian fatteh (rice with crispy flatbread). Buying new clothes is also a tradition shared by Coptic and Islamic holidays as well as family reunions.

Easter day is followed by Spring Day, also known as Sham al-Nessim in Arabic, which is celebrated by all Egyptians but has a special place in Coptic culture. The Arabic name is originally Coptic: “shoum in nissim,” meaning “the garden of crops.” Spring Day is an ancient Egyptian festival celebrated at the beginning of spring.

Origins

When Egypt became Christian in the fourth century BC, Spring Day used to fall in the middle of the Great Fast, making Egyptians unable to enjoy the feast linked to the ancient holiday and the accompanying festivities they are supposed to abstain from during the fast. They therefore decided to celebrate Spring Day the day after Easter. Ever since, Spring Day has become the Monday following Easter Sunday.

Although Copts treat Spring Day as an extension of Easter, the former is marked by special rituals more linked to the ancient Egyptian celebration such as eating salted mullet, green onions and lupin in public parks. The coloring of eggs is similarly ancient Egyptian, with the hatching process being a symbol of life coming out of a lifeless object, which was then analogous to the growing of crops and spring as the season of fertility.

In the Christian tradition, eggs came to be associated with the rising of Christ from his tomb, and red became the preferred color for painting eggs to symbolize His blood, a tradition still followed by Copts.

Politics

As Easter approaches, Copts are speculating over whether President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will attend Mass as he did on Coptic Christmas, an action that was applauded by most Copts as a step toward more tolerance and as a means of assuaging fears of sectarian discrimination that accompanied the Islamist rule of Mohamed Mursi.

In addition to inviting the president and the prime minister according to protocol, Coptic Archbishop Sergius Sergius said 7,000 invitations for Easter Mass have been sent: “Ministers, governors and other state officials are included in the invitations. We should invite the parliament speaker as well but there is none at the moment.”

During Mursi’s rule, the church only invited the president, prime minister and parliament speaker. Analysts saw this as the church’s way of evading the embarrassment of receiving many rejections from the mostly Islamist political scene at the time.

Some Copts opted to spend Easter and the entire Holy Week in Jerusalem to follow the path of Christ in the days that preceded the crucifixion. Around 1,300 Copts flew from Cairo Airport to Tel Aviv for the eight-day pilgrimage that should include the Via Dolorosa, or Way of Sorrows – through which Jesus carried the cross on his way to crucifixion – as well as the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, also called the Church of Resurrection, and the Nativity Church in Bethlehem.

Will Egypt still get its fair share of Nile water?

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The Declaration of Principles signed in Khartoum by Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia reopened the unresolved dispute over the sharing of Nile water, and raised once more the thorny issue of the Renaissance Dam. The declaration aims to set the main principles that would protect the interests of downstream countries, whose share is expected to be threatened by the completion of the Ethiopian dam.

The declaration has been met with mixed reactions. Many question how binding it is on the Ethiopian side, while others see it as a positive step toward ending a crisis that is detrimental to Egypt’s security.

Amr Hamzawi, professor of political science, said the state opting for negotiating to end the standoff is in itself a promising step. “Establishing this kind of dialogue shows that Egypt respects Ethiopia’s development aspirations as represented by the Renaissance Dam while making sure its own rights are not compromised,” he wrote.

“The declaration also eliminates any possibility of a military conflict between the two countries and instead initiates a stage of cooperation in tandem with Sudan and later other Nile Basin countries as well as foreign parties like the U.S., the EU, China, and international financial organizations.”

Criticisms

However, Hamzawi said there were still reasons for concern. “The state has not been transparent enough about how this declaration can actually save Egypt from the impending danger of losing much of the water it badly needs. We have not been informed of the core of this declaration and several questions are not answered like the capacity of the new dam’s reservoir as well as the bilateral talks between Sudan and Ethiopia and the way the two countries would guarantee not infringing on Egypt’s rights.”

Despite his concerns, Hamzawi criticized political factions that saw objection to the agreement as a way of expressing opposition to the government. “Several parties were quick to condemn the agreement without knowing the details and without proposing any alternative solutions to the problem. Voicing valid objections to some of the regime’s practices is one thing and objecting for the sake of objection is another.”

Hamzawi said opposition forces could still criticize the government while objectively supporting its reasonable steps toward maintaining Egypt’s strategic interests.

Nader Nour al-Din, professor of irrigation and water resources, sees the declaration as a mere formality that jeopardizes rather than guarantees Egypt’s rights. According to Nour al-Din, who said he consulted a renowned international law expert on the matter, Ethiopia is the party that emerged victorious after signing the declaration.

“Through signing the declaration, Egypt is bestowing legitimacy on the Renaissance Dam,” he said. “Now that the three Eastern Nile countries have signed the declaration, all international funding for the dam will resume right away. This means $5.5 billion from the National Bank of China, $1 billion from Italy and $1 billion from South Korea, in addition to support from the World Bank.”

The declaration, he added, does not include guarantees that Egypt’s share will be maintained, since Ethiopia did not commit to a specific amount of water to reach Egypt following the construction of the dam. “With this declaration, Ethiopia took everything and Egypt ended up with nothing.”

Nour al-Din said in earlier statements that the World Bank refused to fund the dam because of the harm it would do to Egypt and Sudan, and because of Ethiopia’s history of violating the water rights of its neighbors.

“Ethiopia harmed Kenya by constructing three dams, thus violating an earlier pledge to construct only one dam,” he said. “This deprived Kenya of huge amounts of water and led to the displacement of 5 million Kenyans.” He says Ethiopia “will betray Egypt and keep all the water.”

Benefits

Hani Raslan, head of the Water Resources Unit at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, said the declaration was not binding on any of the parties, but only offered a general framework for future dealings between the signatories. However, he disagrees that the declaration harms Egypt’s interests.

“Nothing in the declaration says that Egypt approves the capacity of the dam’s reservoir since this issue is still being negotiated,” he wrote. “Also, the declaration is not about Egypt’s share of Nile water but only about the dispute over the dam, which means that there is no infringement on Egypt’s historical right to the Nile and the agreements that regulate it.”

Raslan said the declaration is based on the principles of international law and the U.N. Charter, and provides political benefits. “Signing the declaration will improve Egypt’s image on the regional and international levels after the shameful way the Muslim Brotherhood government dealt with the dam issue,” he said.

Raslan was referring to the conference presided over by ousted President Mohamed Mursi and broadcast live without attendees’ knowledge, in which several politicians made derogatory remarks against Ethiopia and suggested hostile ways of dealing with the crisis.

Raslan said the declaration made Ethiopia morally committed before the world to respecting Egypt’s water rights. “At least, Ethiopia is now acknowledging a set of principles that it had earlier denied.”

Water resources expert Ahmed Fawzi refuted claims that signing the declaration means Egypt’s approval of the construction of the Renaissance Dam. “The declaration makes Ethiopia committed to the report that is to be issued by the international consultative office on the impact of the dam on downstream countries,” he said.

Fawzi was referring to the office that is to be chosen by the Tripartite Committee of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, made up of the declaration’s three signatories, and whose findings are to be respected by the three countries as the declaration stipulates. “This is the first time Ethiopia signs an official document that recognizes Egypt’s rights, and the first time it doesn’t contest historical agreements that warrant those rights.”

Damage limitation

Political science lecturer Rawia Tawfik said the declaration was a manifestation of “the diplomacy of managing losses.” After Ethiopia’s insistence on going ahead with the construction of the dam, Egypt had no choice but to resort to negotiations, she said. “The balance of power is now in favor of Ethiopia based on its location as an upstream country that controls 85% of Nile water flowing from the Ethiopian Highlands,” she wrote.

Tawfik said it was important to consider that Ethiopia had since the 1950s been against agreements that guaranteed Egypt’s share of Nile water. “Ethiopia has always considered those agreements an insult to its national dignity since being the country that provides the Nile with most of its water it was not consulted in any of them,” she wrote. “Against this backdrop, the declaration seems a step forward.”

However, Tawfik said Ethiopia would benefit from this declaration more than Egypt. “While Ethiopia is seeing its national dream come true, Egypt is only trying to minimize the damage.”

Egypt’s New Capital: The Promise and the Illusion

Egypt’s New Capital: The Promise and the Illusion

The highlight of Egypt’s three-day investment conference held in mid-March was the announcement of a new capital city. The news also proved to be the most controversial of the international gathering, where Egypt concluded dealssurpassing all previously announced expectations. The 700-square kilometer new capital, the first phase of which it is estimated will cost $45 billion, will be home to administrative facilities currently located in the heart of Cairo, including the parliament, ministries, embassies, and consulates, as well as the presidential palace, and residential areas expected to accommodate more than 7 million people. The government is anticipating the completion of the new capital in a short five to seven years. While the scale model displayed at the conference venue in the Red Sea resort of Sharm al-Sheikh and the documentary played for conference attendees unveiled an impressive megaproject that seems capable of solving Cairo’s chronic problems, skepticism over its success, let alone the feasibility of such an over-ambitious plan has given rise to a heated debate.

Economic expert and former International Monetary Fund official Fakhri al-Fekkisupports the establishment of a new administrative capital to reduce pressure on the densely populated Cairo. “Transferring government buildings to a new city is now a necessity,” he said, adding that Cairo will remain the official capital. Fekki, however, objects to the choice of location. “National security was not put into consideration when choosing a place that is close to the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula.” Fekki is also opposed to the timeframe for completing the project. “The current economic situation in Egypt would not allow the immediate implementation of a project of such magnitude,” he explained. “True, it is important to lay the foundations for a new administrative capital, but not start working on it right away. This could be done gradually as the Egyptian economy picks up and as Egypt’s ability to attract investment increases.”

Professor of International Economics and former Dean at the National Planning Institute Mahmoud Abdel Hayy also supports the idea of an administrative capital, but argued that it is not a priority at the present time. “Investing in water, electricity, oil, and land reclamation should be the topmost priority because this is what offers real security for citizens,” he said, adding that the new city will be another replica of upscale suburban areas built outside Cairo during the Mubarak era. “Those cities only widen the gap between the rich and the poor because only the rich can afford to live there and the poor won’t be able to work there because of the cost of commuting.”

Associate Professor of Economics Ehab al-Dessouki, however, says the advantages of the new capital cannot be overlooked. “Establishing the new city will lead to developing a large part of the desert and will expand Cairo all the way to the coastal city of al-Ain al-Sokhna,” he said. “It will also reduce the pressure on Cairo’s infrastructure and will eventually result in less pollution and congestion.” The project, Dessouki added, will introduce Egyptians to the possibility of going out of the old capital and seeking opportunities in a new city that is expected to offer a large number of jobs. Dessouki, however, noted that there is no guarantee that Egyptians who will work or live in the new capital will not remain attached in one way or another to the old one, which will therefore continue to suffer from the same kinds of pressure it faces today.

Adham Selim, architect and researcher at the Frankfurt-based Städelschule,disagrees with the theory that a new city will reduce pressure on Cairo at all. “If you build a new capital that close to the old one, it is impossible for the problems of the latter not to affect the former,” he said. “In fact, the services and utilities that need to be provided for the new city are bound to constitute a burden on the networks already suffering in the old capital, so the more the new capital demands, the worse the services in the old one will become.” Selim added that even if the new capital offers job opportunities, workers will most likely commute from the old capital. “This will lead to tremendous pressure on public transportation between the two cities especially during rush hour.” According to Professor of Urban Planning Ashraf Fahim, this problem will not be solved unless the government starts new bus lines that connect the old and new capitals and extends the subway to cover the new areas. “Yet, even after doing so, traffic between the two capitals will remain a problem especially since people currently working in ministries and main government facilities live in Cairo,” he said. “Only building housing complexes at the new capital for those employees and making them available for rent at cheaper prices than Cairo would eliminate this obstacle.” Fahim, however, does see a new capital as a step forward for Egypt, provided that it is implemented in the right way. “All government bodies should coordinate to make this project work in a way that really allows Egyptians to get out of the 6 percent [of land] to which they have been confined for hundreds of years,” he said, adding that the government cannot cancel the project after it was officially announced to the world at the conference.

Urban policies researcher Yehia Shawkat argues the policy of constructing new cities to alleviate pressure on Cairo has so far proven a failure because the percentage of the population that actually moves there is meager. “Around twenty new cities have been built throughout the past decades. The total number of housing units in those cities amounts to one million, only a quarter of which are inhabited,” he said. “It is clear that the policy of redistributing the population is not working, yet the government keeps building more cities.” Shawkat added the majority of Cairo’s inhabitants are workers who are tied to the places where they run their small businesses. “They are not going to move to a new city that mainly offers administrative services and they are the biggest population block,” he said. “A study about who is to live in the new city has to be conducted.” In addition to agreeing with many experts as far as increasing the burden on Cairo’s resources is concerned, Shawkat noted that the construction sector will focus on the new city and neglect the old one, which is in dire need of maintenance and development. “This will make the new capital an enterprise which creates an economic bubble, meaning that it will lead to temporary and unreal economic prosperity.”

The initial euphoria over the construction of the new capital is gradually fading with a sizable number of experts underlining the negative impact of the project, and downplaying the economic and demographic benefits it is expected to bring. Some have also questioned the completion of the megaproject, pointing to Egypt’s recent history of similar plans that have failed to materialize. Linking this project to other equally ambitious ones, like the new Suez Canal, might play a role in increasing concerns as many wonder if the state’s image as the initiator of major development projects takes precedence over what it can actually achieve on the ground.

Post-revolution, what have Egyptian women gained?

Feminists and women’s rights activists were among the most hopeful when the Jan. 2011 revolution took place with promises of equality. However, women’s rights issues remains a subject of much controversy. Four years since the first post-revolutionary International Women’s Day, is the annual celebration being matched by changes on the ground?

Hassan al-Shamy, a member of the Arabic Organization for Human Rights (AOHR), said Egyptian women have not been rewarded for their role in the revolution. “Women paid with their lives and… participated in all important political events that followed the revolution, yet weren’t adequately appreciated.”

Shamy said allocating half of parliamentary seats for women is among the most crucial steps that need to be taken toward gender equality. “Women should also have access to all kinds of official positions.”

An AOHR statement expressed concern over the safety of women during protests, and cited the recent death of leftist activist Shaimaa al-Sabagh in a peaceful march commemorating the fourth anniversary of the revolution. “Sabagh’s fate is an indication of the spread of violence against women even though article (11) of the constitution grants women full rights,” said the statement.

The Egyptian Federation of Trade Unions issued a statement highlighting the reasons why women have not been granted enough rights post-revolution. “On the financial level, most women are still dependent on the male members of their families and on the political level, they are still not equated… even though the 2014 constitution prohibited discrimination between men and women.”

The statement added that constitutional and legal rights will never be efficient as long as social constructs are not drastically altered. “We still live in a patriarchal society where tradition takes precedence and where women are still expected to be confined to the domain of the house while men dominate public space.”

Haitham al-Hariri, a member of Al-Dostour party, said the state cares about women only as voters. “Only during times of elections and referenda are women given extra care and their participation in the political scene is promoted as crucial. Yet when this isn’t the case, women are still raped and sexually assaulted in the streets.”

The next parliament, Hariri added, will be an indication of whether actual change will take place. “The percentage of women in the previous parliament was shameful,” he said, in reference the predominantly Islamist parliament elected after the revolution.

Mixed bag

However, writer Ola Abdullah wrote that the 2014 constitution, drafted after the toppling of President Mohamed Mursi, has done great justice to women. “Women have a special status in the 2014 constitution. Around 20 articles in this constitution are directly about women and focus especially on equality between men and women in all civilian, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, granting women access to senior official position, and protecting women from all sorts of violence.”

Some things, she adds, have also been achieved since 2011. “The percentage of women occupying official positions reached 36.3% in 2013 and the current government features five women ministers while the diplomatic representation of women rose to 22.5% in 2012.”

On the downside, Abdullah said the percentage of women in the judiciary does not exceed 4 percent, and women are still unable to join the General Prosecution Authority or the State Council. “There are also certain offices that women have never occupied like president, prime minister, and governor.”

Abdullah said the number of female registered voters rose to 48 percent in 2012, which translates to 23 million, and the participation of women in the various polling processes since the revolution was historic, yet this is not reflected in female representation.

“Women constituted only 2% of the 2012 parliament and the new constitution did not specify a quota of women in upcoming parliaments and only allocated one quarter of municipal councils to women.”

Abdullah said violence against women remains the toughest challenge. “A 2014 report showed that 91% of women in the country and 85% in the city are subjected to female genital mutilation. And 99.3% of Egyptian women have been sexually harassed.”

This issue, said Abdullah, still awaits the next parliament which will look into a draft law prepared by the National Council for Women and aimed at countering violence against women.

A study by the Cairo Center for Development and Human Rights said cancelling the women’s quota is a major reason why their representation in the 2012 parliament was very weak.

This “is bound to limit the number of seats women will get in the 2015 elections,” said Amr Samir, a researcher in political sociology and a participant in the study. “This issue won’t be solved until article (11) of the 2014 constitution about gender equality, which is one of the best since the 1923 constitution, is implemented through a set of legislations.”

The study recommends allocating 60 percent of each electoral list to women and 50 percent of the total number of seats. “Other recommendations include exempting women from the administrative fees of candidacy, and giving women space and airtime equal to men to promote their political agendas,” said Ali Hossam al-Din, a political researcher and another participant in the study.

Political manipulation?

Some analysts view the underestimation of post-revolutionary achievements in women’s rights as influenced by international reports that magnify the problems facing women in Egypt. Howaida Mustafa, professor of mass communication, said members of the Muslim Brotherhood have been living in Europe since Mursi’s ouster, and have infiltrated many organizations to tarnish the image of Egypt.

“That’s why those reports are biased and only focus on condemning violations committed against women and ignoring all achievements,” she said. “The state is actually keen on including women in different decision-making positions, but the problem is that this isn’t shown in the media to counter outside claims.”

Mona Omar, former secretary-general of the National Council for Women, refuted allegations about the rise of sexual harassment and the prevalence of human trafficking in Egypt. “Egypt is witnessing a remarkable development in the field of women rights. The National Council for Women prepared a comprehensive plan for countering violence against women in coordination with 11 ministries.”

Omar said a special unit of female police has been created by the Interior Ministry to deal with sexual harassment. “The ministry is paying close attention to this issue, and the recent verdicts against harassers provide the ultimate proof.”

Hoda Badran, head of the Egyptian Feminist Union, said: “Women’s problems in Egypt are extremely exaggerated. This is only a political campaign.”

Why are Egyptian parliamentary elections postponed?

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Egypt’s parliamentary elections, the first since the ouster of President Mohammad Mursi, have been suspended until further notice. The Supreme Constitutional Court ruling was based on the unconstitutionality of the Electoral Districts Law that divides the country into constituencies.

While the office of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said the law will be modified as soon as possible, it is still unclear if this is the only obstacle, and if the verdict can be overturned with the drafting of a new law. It is also unclear when the elections, originally due to start on March 21, can be held.

According to official statements, the law will be modified as soon as the reasons for judging it unconstitutional are clear. “We are waiting for the report of the Supreme Constitutional Court to know what exactly was wrong with the law and whether we need to add or remove seats,” said General Refaat Qomsan, the prime minister’s advisor for electoral affairs.

The presidency’s statement stressed its full respect for court rulings and promised quick action. “Being keen on ensuring the legitimacy of all state institutions, the president ordered the drafting of a new law in not more than a month,” said the statement.

“It is very important for the president to carry out the third phase of the road map agreed on by all Egyptians,” the statement added, referring to the political agenda that followed Mursi’s ouster, which consisted of three stages: the constitution, the president and parliament.

Timeframe

Zaid Ali, senior advisor on constitution-building for International IDEA, said issuing a new law is expected to take much more time than estimated by the presidency, especially as there is no guarantee that the constitutionality of the new law will not be contested.

“The law’s drafters will now have to go back and redraft the law on the basis of the decision, which will take a while, and then the new versions of the law will also be subject to appeal,” he said, adding that the elections have practically been postponed indefinitely.

Saber Ammar, constitutional expert and member of the Supreme Committee for Legislative Reform, agreed: “The verdict of the Supreme Constitutional Court means that constituencies for individual candidates have to be divided from the beginning, which will take long, especially that this time those who draft the law need to be very meticulous so that no other appeals are filed.”

The process is not just about the law, he added. “All the procedures will be repeated from the beginning, including the applications and selection of candidates.”

Constitutionality

Mohamed Abul Ghar, activist and chairman of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, criticized the state for drafting laws before verifying their constitutionality. “The president does not want a parliament now,” he said. “That is why the call for holding the elections was delayed, and why the state keeps issuing laws that violate the constitution.”

Abul Ghar added that if the elections are eventually held, the resulting parliament will likely be very fragile and unable to make decisions. “This is exactly what the state wants: a parliament that does not act as a watchdog.”

He criticized the alleged interference of security apparatuses in the electoral process. “The National Security Bureau met with several wanna-be candidates, and asked some of them to run and others not to run,” he said, adding that the entire mechanism of parliamentary elections needs to be changed. “Otherwise, it will be just a postponement of another failing round of elections.”

Wahid Abdel Meguid, professor of political science and deputy chairman of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, blames the committee that drafted the law. “While drafting the law, the committee should have sent a memorandum to the Supreme Constitutional Court requesting clarification on articles of the constitution that concern parliamentary elections,” he wrote.

Fairness

Abdel Meguid said terms such as “fair representation” are very broad, and it is unclear how they can be applied to the division of constituencies. “The calculation the committee did to determine the average number of citizens the MP represents was quite faulty, and led to a huge difference in the weight of each vote from one constituency to another,” he said.

Abdel Meguid blamed the state for not consulting experts and political parties before issuing the law. “The law should have… been brought forth for a communal discussion in order to have its defects underlined and redressed.”

Professor of constitutional law Dawoud al-Baz said while the division of constituencies is not usually mentioned in constitutions, and while there is no precedent for a fixed regulation for such a matter, there are several factors that need to be taken into consideration while drafting that law.

“The drafters of the law have to be very accurate in dividing constituencies in a way that makes sure there is no remarkable discrepancy in the number of voters in each constituency, and the imbalance that characterized the disputed law was bound to render the parliament itself illegitimate if the elections were held,” he said. “It is also important to consult politicians and statisticians while dividing constituencies.”

Baz added that it is necessary to abide by the main principles of the constitution while working on the law, in reference to the articles of the constitution (4,9, 53, 87 and 102) that the law violates by not treating citizens and voters equally.

“The division of constituencies for individual candidates shows that the drafters of the law did not observe the rules of fair representation for voters and citizens,” said the verdict. “The law discriminates between voters without any logical basis.”

The Debate over Gamal Mubarak

The Debate over Gamal Mubarak

The release of Alaa and Gamal Mubarak was seen as a staggering blow to the January 25 Revolution by its supporters. While the Mubarak brothers were released on bail in accordance with article 143 of the Criminal Procedures Law, which states that preventive detention should not exceed 18 months, the uneasiness with which the ruling was greeted was not surprising. Between the symbolic failure of the revolution and the actual repercussions of their possible return to the public scene lie numerous concerns, speculations, and apprehensions.

Legal experts argue that it was impossible to keep Alaa and Gamal Mubarak detained any longer. “Only in cases where capital punishment is applicable can defendants be detained pending trial for two years instead of a year and a half,”says Judge Ahmed Haroun, head of the Cairo Criminal Court. The Mubarak sons are not facing charges in which the death penalty can be applied, but upon their re-trial in the pending corruption cases, it will be up to the court to return them to jail as the trial proceeds. According to law professor and former dean of the Law School at Cairo University Mahmoud Kobeish, if they do not show up at the trial, arrest warrants will be issued for both of them. A retrial date has yet to be set.

Apart from the technicalities of the verdict, the bigger question is how it will play out now that Gamal and Alaa have been released. Much of this has focused on Gamal, since among the driving forces behind the 2011 uprising was the belief that he was being groomed as heir-apparent to the Egyptian presidency.

Speculations are rife in the Egyptian media about whether Gamal intends to keep a low profile or plans to restore his past influence. Former Member of Parliament Abdullah al-Mughazi, and a supporter of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, linkedGamal’s release to the August 2014 release of business tycoon and secretary general of the now defunct National Democratic Party (NDP) Ahmed Ezz, who was also one of Gamal’s closest aides. “They are likely to attempt to reunite NDP members, especially since Ezz has already announced his intention to run in parliamentary elections and is reported to have met with several leaders in the disbanded party,” he said. According to Judge Refaat al-Sayed, Alaa and Gamal can both vote and run in national elections since neither has been convicted. Nothing has been said, however, about Gamal exercising this political right, while Ezz has already submitted the papers for his candidacy, as has his wife.

Parliamentary elections are not seen as the only channel through which Gamal might try to regain his influence.  According to political analyst Ammar Ali Hassan, money could be a main factor in the equation. “The Mubarak sons, together with members of the former regime, are expected to curry favor with the current regime by offering it financial support,” he writes. “But if President Sisi gives in, his popularity will be deeply affected and the relationship between the people and the state is bound to sour.” Hassan also notes that the Mubarak regime was never truly uprooted, it could easily make a return. “All the ruling regimes since the revolution have not really taken enough measures to eliminate the influence of Mubarak’s men.”

The return of Gamal Mubarak to the political scene is seen by many as next to impossible. Sameh Ashour, the head of the Lawyer’s Syndicate believes the Mubaraks have lost any support they may have had. “Their influence came to an end once people rose against them,” he says. “Those who supported Gamal did so to serve their interests at the time when he was influential. Now, nothing is to be gained from any alliance with him.” Ashour admits that some members of the former regime might take part in the elections, but he believes their only asset is money, and that they do not enjoy popular support.

Journalist Abdullah al-Sinnawi argues that no faction or party would agree to form an alliance with Gamal. “The last thing political figures need now is to associate their names with the Mubarak regime, especially since Gamal and Alaa might go back to prison.” Sinnawi also notes that Gamal’s failure in the political domain is expected to discourage people from supporting him if he decides to return. “Gamal Mubarak failed in running the country when he was head of the NDP’s Policies Committee and his role in the political scene was a major reason for the January 25 Revolution.”

Those who find it unlikely for Gamal Mubarak to find a place in the Egyptian political scene are probably right. After all, Gamal’s possible inheritance of power made him just as hated as his father. In fact, while some Egyptians may have sympathy for Hosni Mubarak, citing his age, or the necessary respect a former leader should be afforded, Gamal has not earned a similar respect within these circles. While news has already circulated that Gamal may run in the 2018 presidential elections, this seems to be the product of nothing more than an overactive rumor mill, especially in light of the popularity the current president enjoys. If any member of the Mubarak family is to have any influence, be it economic or political, this will likely not happen without a green light from the current regime. However, even if they remain ostracized from Egypt’s political life, the release of the Mubaraks is a major defeat to a revolution in which no one has been held accountable for thirty years of corruption, abuse of power, and tyranny.

Assessing Egypt’s campaign against Sinai militants

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2015/02/11/Assessing-Egypt-s-campaign-against-Sinai-militants.html

The latest attacks on military targets in the Sinai were seen as the most shocking, not only because of the number of casualties, the penetration of highly-secured areas, or the advanced tactics used by the assailants, but also because the attacks followed a series of reportedly successful campaigns against militant strongholds in THE PENINSULA.

The last factor in particular was a source of concern among analysts, who underlined the necessity of contemplating whether the state is making any actual progress in eliminating terrorism.

The first official reaction to the Jan. 29 bombings said they were driven by the “successful strikes carried out by the army and the police against militants and their strongholds in North Sinai, and the Muslim Brotherhood’s failure to wreak havoc on the fourth anniversary” of the Jan. 25 revolution that toppled President Hosni Mubarak.

General Alaa Ezz el-Din, director the Armed Forces Center for Strategic Studies, said the attacks are a sign that militants are “becoming increasingly desperate” following successful strikes against them.

Writer and sociologist Al-Sayed Yassin said the army is fighting a global war and protecting the world from terrorism, which is why the mission will take time. “Terrorism is threatening the whole world since it is based on a set of fixed ideas to which youths from everywhere are attracted,” he wrote, adding that Egypt cannot face this growing threat alone.

Yassin underlined the difficulty of garnering international support for Egypt’s efforts. “Calls for international cooperation will be obstructed by superpowers, especially the United States, which are conspiring with the Muslim Brotherhood to serve their political interests.”

Patrick Kingsley, The Guardian’s correspondent in Egypt, sees the state’s inability to contain attacks as related to its enemy, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. “In reality no one knows exactly who runs it, or how centralized its operations are, nor its relationships with local tribes, other smaller militant groups in Sinai, or al-Qaeda itself,” he wrote, adding that it has not been possible to know the number of militants launching such attacks, but that they are reportedly increasing.

Ill equipped

Former Israeli ambassador to Cairo, Zvi Mazel, wrote that Egypt’s army “is not prepared for a guerilla war since its training mostly focused on conventional wars that have not been taking place in the Middle East for years.”
The army, Mazel added, is not only facing extremist militants but also Sinai locals. “These are Bedouins who are not willing to cooperate with a state that has for decades marginalized them. That is why they cooperated with Hamas in building tunnels and some of them even joined jihadi operatives to avenge themselves on the state under the name of Islam.”

What makes Egypt’s job harder, he added, is a lack of support from the West. “It is quite surprising that Egypt is not getting support from the West, especially the United States which continues to support the Muslim Brotherhood and which can provide the training the Egyptian army needs for this type of war. The same applies to the European Union that is not making any effort to help Egypt.”

For Borzou Daragahi, the Financial Times correspondent in Cairo, the attacks “brought into question claims by the armed forces that their hardline security strategy was working in Sinai.” Borzou said targeting one of the Egyptian army’s most formidable units, Battalion 101, highlights the growing strength of militants.

He referred to the commentary of H A Hellyer, Egypt and Middle East specialist at the London-based Royal United Services Institute, about the sophistication of the recent attack compared to earlier ones. “It is one thing to kill two dozen people in a single place. It is another to target a dozen places at once,” said Hellyer. “The latter is far more effective and disruptive.”

Hellyer added: “The armed forces seem to be getting the guys they say they’re getting. But if the point to their counter-insurgency efforts was to ensure that attacks like this don’t take place, obviously they failed.”

Comprehensive plan

Journalist Mohamed Azzam said the state “needs to have a comprehensive plan, and the security dimension should only be part of it. In all confrontations between the state and religious extremists through the eras of [Gamal Abdel] Nasser, [Anwar] Sadat and Mubarak, this approach has not only proven a failure, but also made terrorist groups grow fiercer.”

According to Azzam, a comprehensive plan should comprise three parts. The security dimension, which means military strikes, is one. “The second is development. If Sinai remains undeveloped it will remain an easy shelter to all clandestine groups.”

The third is Sinai residents becoming active participants in Egyptian politics. “Political marginalization plays a major role in encouraging locals to take up arms against the state or join groups that do.”

Failure

Journalist Mohamed Hani said the state’s reaction to every attack demonstrates its failure. “After each terrorist attack, we only hear vows of revenge and calls for supporting the state in its war on terrorism, but that is it,” he wrote.

“Those who question the state’s approach or demand an explanation on how highly-secured areas can be attacked are accused of treason or supporting terrorism.” Hani said the state is trying to distract Egyptians from its inability to eliminate terrorism.

Writer Michel Naguib attributes the state’s failure to “draining rather than eliminating terrorism. The state has not been targeting terrorist cells on a regular basis, but rather waits until a terrorist attack takes place in order to launch military strikes until it drains militants temporarily, then forces withdraw to their barracks away from volatile areas. This allows militants to regroup and get more weapons to strike again.”

Naguib said the recent establishment of a special military command permanently based in the Sinai is the only hope in reversing this failure. However, “this decision came very late, after terrorists… already built an infrastructure, obtained new weapons, and agreed on the next targets.”

The challenges of tackling female genital mutilation in Egypt

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2015/02/03/The-challenges-of-tackling-female-genital-mutilation-in-Egypt.html

The first doctor to face trial for performing female genital mutilation (FGM) was handed a two-year jail sentence with hard labor for manslaughter, and another three months for performing an illegal practice.

The case, the first to be referred to criminal court after FGM was officially banned in 2008, was filed by the National Population Council (NPC) and the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (NCCM) following the death of a 13-year-old at the doctor’s clinic. The operation was performed at the request of her father, who was sentenced to three months in the same case.

The verdict is the first to herald a serious move from the theoretical ban on FGM to the practical prosecution of its perpetrators. “The verdict is a triumph for women,” said lawyer Reda al-Danbouki, head of the Women’s Center for Guidance and Legal Awareness, and who represented the deceased.

Debate is ongoing, however, about how far such a step can eliminate a practice that has for decades been regularly observed in several parts of Egypt. “The victims of female genital mutilation are finally vindicated,” said the Egyptian Feminist Union, in reference to scores of young girls who die in the process.

“This is a historic verdict which proves that children are not the property of their parents and warns that supporting circumcision implies approving subsequent deformation and/or death and makes all parties involved accomplices in the crime.” The statement, however, said further procedures were required to curb and eventually eliminate the phenomenon.

“The penalty for practicing female genital mutilation should be intensified through modifying article 240 of the Penal Code. The Doctors’ Syndicate should also take a firm stance against any doctor who performs circumcision.” The statement referred to the challenge facing rights organizations, with surveys estimating the percentage of Egyptian women undergoing circumcision at 91 percent.

NPC rapporteur Atef al-Shitani hailed the verdict as historic, especially since the law has been in place for seven years. Shitani said FGM is not only prohibited by the law, but also by the constitution, though this is still not enough. “Articles 11, 18 and 80 of the Egyptian constitution state that women and children are to be protected from all sorts of violence and abuse, but work on the ground is the most effective.

“The NPC, for example, launched the National Program for Family Empowerment and the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilation. This program raises awareness about the danger of the practice, alerts people across Egypt that it is illegal, and encourages families to report doctors who practice it.”

UNICEF representative in Egypt Philippe Duamelle said the verdict “is a precedent and sends out a strong signal that FGM, which still affects the lives of so many girls each year, is no longer to be tolerated.” However, he underlined the obstacles faced by any institution that campaigns against the practice.

Tradition or religion?

“I know how delicate it is to address cultural norms and traditions here, but with all due respect to cultural norms and traditions, those which have such dramatic negative impact on people have to be changed and abandoned. Now what is important is not just that the progress continues, but that progress accelerates,” Duamelle said. “This would happen by not only having a solid legal framework, but also in enforcing these laws.”

Journalist Deena Adel Eid said traditions constitute the main challenge to eliminating FGM. “Many in Egypt believe that FGM is rooted in religion, and that it is parents’ duty as Muslims to cut their daughters,” she wrote, adding that this was not changed by Al-Azhar’s statement dissociating the practice from Islamic law. “Many Christian families in Egypt also practice FGM, claiming they are continuing the practice for ‘moral’ reasons – FGM is viewed as a sign of a woman’s chastity.”

Vivian Fouad, a leading member in the NPC campaign, said even though FGM is linked more to morals than religion, figures trusted by the public play a major role in lending it legitimacy. “Part of it is myth. Many still wrongly believe that if they don’t circumcise girls, they will grow up to be sex-obsessed creatures – a belief that is perpetuated by respected community and religious leaders, who also circumcise their daughters.”

This “myth,” Eid added, takes precedence over the law. “Families who carry on the practice believe it’s essential for religious and moral reasons and value the time-honored tradition over the new law. Thus, cases of FGM largely go unreported.”

The statement issued by Al-Azhar against FGM was supported by a fatwa from Dar al-Iftaa, the body in charge of issuing religious edicts, which said FGM was “prohibited in Islam.”

However, many religious scholars disagree, including those from Al-Azhar. Professor Abdel Ghaffar Helal said while FGM is not obligatory in Islam, it is also not prohibited. “FGM is, in fact, recommended,” he said. “The real problem is not in circumcision as a practice, but in the fact that many of those who perform it are not qualified. That is why I call for prosecuting doctors who harm girls during circumcision.”

Hanaa Abu Shahba, professor of psychology at Al-Azhar, called FGM “a double-edged weapon,” acknowledging that it was traumatic for girls who undergo it, but adding that sometimes it is necessary. “If the girl’s genitals are oversized, she becomes like men in the way she wants to have sex all the time, which is very humiliating to her. A specialist has to be consulted about whether the girl needs to have part of her genitals removed.”

Ibtesam Morsi, professor of sociology at Al-Azhar, condemned the practice but objected to the methods used to fight it. “It is not wise to criminalize circumcision all of a sudden,” she said. “Instead, society should have been gradually prepared for abandoning the practice through the media outlets, schools, and awareness campaigns that acquaint people with the fatal risks involved in the process.”

Morsi said the law simply drove many to circumvent it rather than stop the practice altogether. “People are going back to taking their girls to midwives for circumcision after several doctors started refusing to perform the procedure for fear of persecution following the official ban.”

It is noteworthy that the verdict was passed after much lobbying by anti-FGM activists, since the prosecutor at the time of the girl’s death in June 2013 refused to refer the case to court, said Danbouki.

“The prosecutor himself saw female genital mutilation as a necessity. In fact, he sympathized with the doctor,” Danbouki explained. “It was only when he was replaced by another prosecutor that we were able to go ahead with the lawsuit. Even then, the father and the doctor were both acquitted until we appealed and finally a judge that understands.”

Razing Rafah: The toll of the buffer zone

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2015/01/27/Razing-Rafah-The-toll-of-the-buffer-zone.html

The entire border city of Rafah is to be levelled to the ground, Egyptian authorities have announced. “The establishment of a buffer zone requires the complete removal of the city. In fact, it will be completely destroyed,” said Abdel Fattah Harhour, governor of North Sinai, to which Rafah is administratively affiliated.

“A new Rafah is to be established, and until this happens, evacuated families shall receive financial compensation.” Harhour said the buffer zone, originally intended to be 500-meters long between Egypt and the Gaza Strip, needed to be expanded to stop militancy in the Sinai Peninsula.

Benefitting Israel

Some analysts see Israel as the only beneficiary. Journalist Moheb Emad said the zone was an Israeli request. “Israel asked Egypt to establish a buffer zone with Gaza several times, the first of which was right after Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai,” he wrote.

“At the time, the Egyptian authorities evacuated 350 meters along the border.” Emad added that Israel called for a bigger buffer zone after the second Palestinian uprising, but Egypt built a concrete wall between Rafah and Gaza instead.
Mohamed Nabil, a member of the April 6 Youth Movement’s politburo, said: “Israel has for years been making sure Sinai is left undeveloped and unpopulated, and now we are giving them exactly what they want.”

Yahya Moussa, head of the oversight committee at the Palestinian Legislative Council and a member of Hamas, said Egypt is prioritizing Israel’s security over the lives of Gazans.

“The decision aims at serving global and regional politics against the Palestinian people, and will only increase the suffering in the Gaza Strip,” he said. “These are free services that Cairo is offering to serve regional interests and protect Israel’s security at the expense of our people’s interests and stability in Gaza.”

Journalist and Middle East expert Hana Levi Julian said the plan benefits both Egypt and Israel. “The existence of the city of Rafah still constitutes a military weak point vis a vis Gaza and Hamas, as it does for Israel,” said Julian, adding that being the only border crossing that is not under Israeli control, Rafah is the most prone to falling under the control of extremist militants.
“In Jordan, the sole crossing with Iraq was shut down last year after the Iraq side was seized by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,” she said. “European monitors in Rafah who were supposed to remain at the site to ‘keep the peace’ and maintain its neutrality abandoned their posts at the first sign of danger years ago.”

Julian linked the razing of Rafah and the destruction of tunnels that Hamas uses to smuggle weapons into Gaza and militants out. “But if there is no home to camouflage a tunnel entrance or exit, and no city in which a terrorist can hide, it will be that much harder for Gaza terror to gain a foothold in Egypt. Fewer supplies to terrorists will mean fewer attacks on Egyptian security personnel… Fewer supplies via Egypt hopefully will mean fewer weapons with which to attack Israel.”

Local toll

Sinai activist Saeid Aateeq underlined the communal trauma to be sustained by evacuated locals and their offspring. “All locals are now miserable for leaving their lands and homes, and face an unknown fate. This bitterness will be bequeathed to future generations,” he said.

Aateeq acknowledged the danger of tunnels built between Gaza and Rafah, but objected to the way the state is dealing with the problem. “Those tunnels constituted an illegal pathway into Egyptian territories and were used in activities that compromised Egypt’s national security, so they had to be removed. However, security in Sinai will only be achieved through development and never through evacuation.”

Problem misdiagnosis?

Writer Fahmi Howeidi questions the validity of linking terrorist attacks in the Sinai to Hamas, and assuming that razing Rafah will bring security to THE PENINSULA. “It is obvious that destroying the tunnels and creating a buffer zone have not yielded the desired results, which gives an impression that the initial assumption that Hamas is the culprit might be mistaken after all,” he wrote.

Howeidi called on the state to reconsider its strategy in the Sinai in a way that eliminates terrorism without uselessly draining the army. “Strategic thinking should rise above intransigence, and while its aim remains the same, it can always change the means through looking into alternatives,” he said.

Journalist Frederick Deknatel says the state’s preoccupation with getting rid of the Muslim Brotherhood, of which Hamas is an offshoot, is leading it to fight the wrong battles.

“In the Sinai, the threat of jihadi militancy is dire and growing, but the government and state media, obsessed with crushing the Brotherhood, often distort its nature and conflate all militants with Hamas,” he wrote, pointing out the role of Ansar Beit al-Maqdes, which has pledged allegiance to ISIS, in Sinai terrorist attacks.

Support

The official discourse is, however, seen as legitimate by many. Journalist Abdel Fattah Abdel Moneim said expanding the buffer zone was the only way to eliminate terrorism in THE PENINSULA, which he solely linked to Hamas and the Brotherhood.

“The tunnels were used for carrying out terrorist attacks against Egypt,” he wrote. “We cannot deny the ties between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas under the pretext of defending the Palestinian cause. Egypt’s national security is above everything.”

Supporters of the decision include residents of THE PENINSULA. Sinai activist Mona Barhoum said the tricks used to hide tunnel entrances and exits made it impossible to uncover them by traditional means.

“Tunnels are usually hidden in places that are not normally searched by security officers, like bathrooms and kitchens inside houses,” she said. “Others are hidden in the middle of olive and peach farms, and those are especially used for larger items that cannot be smuggled through houses.”

Some tunnels have several entrances and exits, so if one is discovered and closed the others are used, Barhoum added. “Those tricks have only started lately when raids intensified and security was tightened in THE PENINSULA, which had not been the case for years.”

Will a ‘remove the hijab’ campaign turn heads in Egypt?

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2015/01/15/Will-a-remove-the-hijab-campaign-turn-heads-in-Egypt-.html

The headscarf, or “hijab,” has always been a controversial issue in Egypt, with most clerics saying it is obligatory in Islam, while intellectuals call it a tradition rather than a religious rule.

The controversy intensified with a campaign called “The International Day for Taking Off the Headscarf,” launched in Sept. 2013 by Bahaa Anwar, head of the Secular Party of Egypt and a prominent Egyptian Shiite.

The campaign never took off, but the debate has continued into 2015.

“The headscarf is not obligatory in Islam and it is used by clerics to control women. A piece of cloth cannot possibly determine how religious a woman is,” said Anwar, adding that his party planned to provide counseling for women who are forced to wear the headscarf or want to take it off.

Politics

Many commentators say taking off the hijab is politically motivated. Psychology professor Rashad Abdel Latif said a year of Muslim Brotherhood rule led youths to associate religion with extremism. “Women took off the headscarf as a statement against extremist ideas promoted by the Brotherhood and other Islamist factions,” he said.

Professor of political sociology Saeid al-Sadeq said the Brotherhood and its supporters tarnished the image of Islam. “Islamists used a violent discourse, and they followed talk about Islamic law with threats of torture and murder,” he said.

Professor of psychology Mohamed Nabil said the Brotherhood was incapable of understanding the nature of the Egyptian people. “They did not realize that Egyptians will be repulsed by the aggressive ways they used to promote Islamic principles, and will never be forced into doing something through such terrorizing acts,” he said.

Abdel Latif, Sadeq and Nabil also linked the phenomenon of taking off the hijab to the rise of atheism in Egypt, citing the latter as another consequence of Brotherhood rule.

Journalist Sara Allam linked taking off the headscarf to the rebellious atmosphere that has prevailed since the Jan. 25 revolution that toppled President Hosni Mubarak. “The 2011 revolution reshaped the Egyptian society as rebellion was proven to yield fruits,” she wrote, adding that this specifically affected women who played a major role in toppling the regime and realized they were capable of challenging other taboos.

“Women started reconsidering their position in society, and rebellion extended to the general patriarchal system,” she wrote. “That is when the legend of the veil fell, and women who claimed they were wearing it out of conviction admitted they were victims of a manipulative religious discourse.” Taking off the hijab, Allam said, was no longer the taboo it used to be.

Religion

However, Islamist analysts and supporters of the headscarf have focused on religion rather than politics. Safaa Salah al-Din, one of the administrators of preacher Amr Khaled’s website, says many girls wear the hijab without knowing its religious value, either because they are forced by their parents upon puberty, or because religious institutions do not sufficiently raise religious awareness.

Salah al-Din also criticized veiled women who behave in an un-Islamic manner, thus providing a bad example to others. “We cannot only blame the woman who takes off the headscarf, but also the surroundings that did not help her to understand the value of such a step,” she wrote.

Psychologist Amr Abu Khalil blames the clergy’s post-revolution behavior for women’s growing disinterest in wearing the headscarf. “When preachers started getting involved in politics, women no longer found the support they needed to keep the headscarf,” he said. “The same happened with men who became reluctant to marry veiled women, and this encouraged women even more to take off the veil.”

Fashion

Azza Kurayem, a sociology professor and advisor at the National Center for Social and Criminal Studies, focuses on the social aspect of the phenomenon, as she links the headscarf to fashion trends.

“In the sixties, when liberal ideas were promoted, women wore miniskirts and men had long hair, then it got more conservative in the seventies and eighties and this is when the headscarf started spreading,” she said. Similarly, the hijab “started off strict, then women began wearing tighter and more revealing clothes while keeping the headscarf, until they eventually took it off.”